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A graph representation of the financial relations in a given monetary structure is proposed. It
is argued that the graph of debt-liability relations is naturally organized and simplified into a
tree structure, around banks and a central bank. Indeed, this optimal graph allows to perform
payments very easily as it amounts to the suppression of loops introduced by pending payments.
Using this language of graphs to analyze the monetary system, we first examine the systems
based on commodity money and show their incompatibility with credit. After dealing with the
role of the state via its ability to spend and raise taxes, we discuss the chartalist systems based
on pure fiat money, which are the current systems. We argue that in those cases, the Treasury
and the central bank can be meaningfully consolidated. After describing the interactions of
various autonomous currencies, we argue that fixed exchanged rates can never be maintained,
and we discuss the controversial role of the IMF in international financial relations. We finally
use graph representations to give our interpretation on open problems, such as the monetary
aggregates, the sectoral financial balances and the endogenous nature of money. Indeed, once
appropriately consolidated, graphs of financial relations allow to formulate easily unambiguous
statements about the monetary arrangements.
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Introduction
Understanding the fundamental nature of money is
paramount for macroeconomic models. Indeed, over the
past century, the description of money was central to
the building of simplified models of macroeconomics, and
monetary economics became a field of macroeconomics
in itself. The classicals first postulated that money was
neutral and avoided the need for any suitable descrip-
tion. The new classicals, and most prominently the mon-
etarists (Milton Friedman) reached a milder version of
this statement with the quantity theory of money, stat-
ing that money was neutral in the long run. Again, the
debate was not on the structure of the monetary system
but rather on its implications for macroeconomic theo-
ries. The debate between neoclassicals and Keynesians
led instead to theories of money being descriptions of the
monetary system, but these are in fact restricted to the-
ories of interest rates, with mainly the theory of liquidity
preference for the Keynesian approach and the loanable
fund theory for the neoclassical approach, and these are
often summarized and popularized in the IS/LM mod-
els of the neoclassical synthesis. In general, the urge for
economists to provide guidance for politicians and cen-
tral bankers forced them to avoid questioning the struc-
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ture of the monetary system. In the tradition of classical
economics, economists were more interested in finding
microfoundations for their models in a reductionist per-
spective, that is to deduce them from microeconomic be-
haviours, rather than unveiling the complex structure of
the monetary system in a top-down approach.
There is certainly no unique theory of money, since
money is not a universal concept. Indeed, any monetary
arrangement in a society is different and leads to a spe-
cific description. We should indeed rather describe the
various possibilities of monetary systems rather than talk
about a unique theory of money, including those which
have been or are realized, but also allow for the descrip-
tion of possible systems which are not yet realized in
practice, as required by the general democratic debate.
This is nicely summarized by Minsky (1996, p1): “[. . . ]
relevant theory is not a compendium of propositions de-
rived from axioms assumed to be universally true: eco-
nomic theory is not a subdivision of mathematics. Rel-
evant theory is the result of the exercise of imagination
and logical powers on observations that are due to expe-
rience: it yields propositions about the operation of an
actual economy” .
Descriptive approaches thus prefer to focus first on the
different possible monetary systems, before drawing con-
clusions which are necessarily restricted in their scope.
They can be gathered so far in two major categories: met-
allism and chartalism. Oversimplifying, one can say that
metallism is the description of monetary systems in which
2money is backed by a real asset, often gold, whereas char-
talism is the description of monetary systems based on
pure fiat money that originates from the state’s ability
to raise tax (see Bell (2001) for a historical perspective
and Knapp (1924); Lerner (1947); Mitchell-Innes (1913)
for seminal papers). Since the end of the Bretton Woods
system in 1971, which was already a remote form of con-
vertibility, this latter descriptive framework has received
renewed attention and is often named neochartalism in
that respect (Wray, 1990). Following these two general
categories, the debate is often about knowing if money
is exogenous or endogenous, as the question of its funda-
mental nature arises, and one wants to know how to use
monetary and budget policy to influence the economic
situation of a given monetary area.
All fields of human knowledge had to develop a suit-
able formalism from which the results are presented in
their simpler form. For instance rephrasing mathematics
with symbols and equations rather than in full sentences
helps enormously in its formulation and its communica-
tion. But rather than a replacement of the general lan-
guage, it is an enrichment, and even in books of mathe-
matics or physics, the major part is written in the gen-
eral language, even inside the proofs of theorems. The
formalism is indeed only used when it clarifies, and never
to obfuscate. In this article, we develop a graph represen-
tation of the structure of monetary arrangements, based
on the fact that accounting is performed with double en-
try balance sheets. Such graphs are rather common in
representations of flows in macroeconomics, but are gen-
erally absent for the description of stocks, although they
have already been extensively used to study the systemic
risks in networks of commercial banks [see e.g. Sheldon
& Maurer (1998); Upper & Worms (2004); Wells (2004)].
To phrase it shortly, graphs are often used to explain
how things evolve, but not to detail how things are or-
ganized at a given time. Given the complexity of the
monetary systems, a graph description leads to a much
simpler visualization. Nearly all debates about the struc-
ture of the monetary system can be rephrased in a very
compact form using such graphs, as it allows to represent
all balance sheets at the same time while consolidating
sub-sectors.
We thus argue that this is the natural language in
which the discussions about the nature of monetary sys-
tems should be carried out. By representing a complex
structure in a very compact form, it thus carries a much
clearer information, just like a very deep equation car-
ries a powerful meaning in just one line. Using this lan-
guage we then discuss the various possible monetary ar-
rangements and how they are related. This opens then
possibility to discuss on a clear basis the major topics
associated with the monetary system which are
• the monetary policy (money creation and interest
rates setting);
• the budgetary policy (debt issuance);
• the interaction of various autonomous monetary
systems (international monetary relations).
Not only do graph representations simplify these discus-
sions, as they help in the formulation of the various pos-
sible monetary arrangements, but they also facilitate the
communication with non-experts, and this should be a
major concern in democracies, for any choice of mone-
tary arrangement is a choice of society.
This article is organized as follows. We first review
in § I how graphs are usually used to represent flows in
a given unit of account between different members of a
financial system. The use of graphs for stocks will then
appear as a natural generalization, and we explain in § II
how we can build a simple graphical representation for
the representation of the asset-liability relations in a fi-
nancial system. We also discuss the introduction of a
state in the representation, from which we start to dis-
cuss the monetary and budgetary policies in § III. A gen-
eral picture of a system with several currencies is also
rephrased using graphs in § IV. Finally, we discuss some
controversial issues in § V, such as the European Mon-
etary Union (EMU), the monetary aggregates, the sec-
toral financial balances, and finally reconsider the debate
about the exogenous vs endogenous nature of money.
I. USING GRAPHS FOR FLOWS
In this section we review how flows of funds are typi-
cally represented by graphs (in the sense of graph theory),
and we assume that there exists a unit of account (e.g.
$ or e) in which these flows are expressed. We postpone
the discussion about the origin of such unit of account,
and simply assume it exists.
A typical flow a funds between n actors, can be summa-
rized by the numerical entries of an antisymmetric matrix
or table , which is simply the set of aij with 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that aij = −aji). Indeed, if actor i
pays a given positive amount aij > 0 to member j, it can
also be considered that actor j pays the negative amount
aji = −aij < 0 to actor i1. Furthermore, an actor cannot
emit a payment to himself so aii = 0. An immediate con-
sequence is that there are at most n(n−1)/2 payments for
these n members. However, in a typical set of payments
corresponding to a given period of time, there are much
less bilateral payments than the maximum allowed. This
is because actors have only economic interactions with a
subset of all actors. This implies that most entries of the
matrix of payments are vanishing.
1 Note that because economics is often expressed in the general
language, it is reluctant to use relative numbers, that is which can
be positive or negative. It prefers to state that somebody receives
a positive amount than pays a negative amount. Similarly, assets
and liabilities are always positive quantities, but it is implied that
a negative asset is a liability and a negative liability is a positive
asset.
3In this context, it appears much more enlightening
to use a representation based on a weighted graph (see
Fig. 1). The n vertices of the graph are just the n mem-
bers of the economic system, and the edges which connect
these vertices are related to the non-vanishing entries of
the matrix of payments. If aij is positive (respectively
negative), then we can even say that the edge is oriented
from i to j (respectively from j to i), and in either case
the weight of the edge from i to j is given by aij .
FIG. 1 Top: disconnected graph of payments with no cycle.
Bottom: connected graph of payments with two cycles.
First, we will disregard graphs which are not fully con-
nected, since each of its connected parts can be decom-
posed into a superposition of connect graphs. Each sub-
graph represents just the payments inside a community.
A very general result is that a connected graph with n
vertices, and m payments with m ≥ n necessarily pos-
sesses cycles. This result can easily be obtained by in-
duction. If there is a cycle, this means that unnecessary
payments are made, since for instance we have a pattern
where member 1 is paying member 2 which pays mem-
ber 3 which then pays member 1. It is then sufficient to
subtract the same amount from all these payments inside
a cycle such that one of the edges vanishes and thus be
removed from the graph structure of payments. A typ-
ical arrangement inside a connected graph can thus be
reduced to a graph with n members and at most n − 1
payments (see Fig. 2).
In order to achieve a practical graph of payments where
the number of transactions is minimum, we notice that
a tree with one member being the root and all other
members being leaves which are connected individually
to the unique root, is also a graph with n edges and n−1
vertices. It is no wonder that this is in general the pattern
which is found to settle the payments. One member acts
as a banker and centralizes all the payments from other
members as well as payments to other members. Rather
than a general connected graph, the payment structure
takes then the form of a tree. In its simplest form, it
is a tree with depth unity (that is all leaves are directly
connected to the root banker). Each individual i but the
banker (labeled by iB) is thus paying pi to the banker
in the relative sense (paying if positive and receiving if
negative), given by
pi =
n∑
j=1
aij , (1)
such that
∑
i pi = 0 given the property
∑
ij aij = 0. By
construction, the banker receives what is he is owed, as
it is simply
−piB =
n∑
i=1
i6=iB
pi . (2)
This means that the typical organization of a payment
structure is to go from a disorganized graph with many
cycles, to a tree graph with no cycle at all. This self-
organizing feature can be done completely to lead to a
tree graph of depth unity, but it can also be partial, with
a few cycles remaining. In this latter case, then there
are several bankers each one of them organizing the pay-
ments from and to a subset of the members, but these
bankers organize their payments in a disorganized graph
with cycles. If the bankers decide to remove the cycles
as well, they can also organize around a preferred bank,
which would then act as a central bank. The central
bank could be one of the banks and one would reach a
payment tree structure with depth 2. This is illustrated
in Fig. 3.
Since stocks are the results of the integration of flows
over time, it seems natural to represent the structure of
stocks with similar graphs, and this is the central point of
this article. Eventually one would like to be able to rep-
resent both stocks and flows in a compact and readable
form.
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FIG. 2 Top: typical graph with two cycles. Down: after
removal of the cycles, there are less edges than vertices.
II. GRAPHS FOR STOCKS
A. Unit of account
Before turning to stocks, we must specify what is ex-
changed. In the graphs representing the flows of pay-
ments, it was assumed that the payments were made in
some unit of account, without specifying what it could
be. There are essentially two features which are neces-
sary2 to define a unit of account.
• A given unit of account possessed by a member
must refer to something which is completely indis-
tinguishable from what is referred to by the same
amount of unit of account used by another member;
2 We emphasize that a necessary condition is not a sufficient con-
dition, so it is not a defining list of conditions.
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FIG. 3 Top: typical graph of payments with a network of
bankers. Down: typical graph of payments with banks acting
through a central bank.
• What is referred to by the unit of account must be
something which can be possessed by any member,
and the payment corresponds to a change in its
ownership.
If the unit of account is a general commodity, then the
unit of account is rather straightforward to define. It is
any unit in which it is natural to measure the commodity.
In the most simple case of gold, then it is sufficient to use
for instance a unit of mass. As long as it refers to some-
thing which is invariant, a given amount possessed by
somebody is completely equivalent to the same amount
possessed by somebody else. In that respect, an amount
of gold is a good unit of account since gold is invari-
ant through economic space and economic time, but it
is clearly not possible to use a given amount of land as
different domains are not comparable. Land can be pos-
sessed, but two equal areas of land are not equivalent.
5In general, we must thus distinguish between real as-
sets which are distinguishable, and real assets which are
indistinguishable. In the former case, only a share of
ownership of a given asset can be used as a unit of ac-
count since each real asset is different from another one.
This is in general of limited use, unless the real asset is
very large and we can thus define many small shares of
ownership. For instance a share of ownership of a large
company can be used as a unit of account. In the case of
a real asset whose nature is to be indistinguishable, that
is a general commodity, it can be readily used as a unit
of account once an invariant and unambiguous measure
has been agreed upon.
B. Representing commodity ownership
For flows the key feature in a graph representation is
the change of ownership of the unit of account. However,
for stocks, a key feature which must appear is the relation
of ownership itself. We thus represent each commodity
(by this we mean the totality of this existing commodity)
or each real asset on a single vertex, and the ownership
is represented by an edge which links it to the differ-
ent members possessing a part of it. On the edge, we
draw an outgoing arrow from the commodity vertex or
the real asset vertex to stress that it is a liability, and
an ingoing arrow on the members which have ownership,
to emphasize that it is an asset. It is thus an oriented
edge, and the amount written on the edge is then the
amount of asset for the owner and the amount of liabil-
ity for the commodity or the real asset, expressed in the
unit of account. In that representation, a commodity can
be considered to be completely stored in a vault, and the
liability of the commodity can be viewed as the liability
of the vault itself. Since the vault is nobody’s, the cor-
responding assets of members are net assets as they are
not the liability of somebody else. If the concept of a
vault is not a purely theoretical simplification, and if the
commodity is really stored somewhere with a guard, then
we can reach a more complicated structure of ownership,
where it is the vault keeper which acts as a bank safe and
possesses all the commodity, but in turn issues liabilities
to the customers who have brought the commodity there
for safety reasons. The members of the system can thus
in general either possess directly the unit of account, or
own it indirectly through a bank, and we would typically
say that they have a (positively credited) account in that
bank. In that case, we say that the bank issues an I
Owe You (IOU), as a record of the gold which has been
placed into the vault. In the first case the members of
the system need to physically exchange the commodity,
and in the second case they only exchange the ownership
certificate, that is they exchange the IOUs. A possible
extension is then to reach a system in which this indirect
ownership is made through several banks. See Fig. 4 for
a graphical illustration of commodity ownership.
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FIG. 4 Top: direct ownership of a commodity. Middle: indi-
rect ownership of a commodity through a single bank. Bot-
tom: indirect ownership through several banks, with each
bank owning directly the commodity.
6C. Centralized and decentralized banking
The system of keeping track of ownership with the ac-
tual commodity stored in a vault is a primitive system of
bank, and it is likely that there will be the appearance
of several bankers. Depending on the degree of coopera-
tion several configurations are bound to appear once cus-
tomers of different banks start to interact in the economic
world and need to exchange (that is to settle payments).
• Independent banking. The banks can ignore each
other. This would force every customer to have a
bank account in each bank. Or at least once a per-
son needs to accept a payment from somebody else
having its assets in a given bank, this person would
be forced to open a bank account in the same bank,
so as to be able to transfer the liability. Eventu-
ally we just have several copies of the same system,
which could be merged (all banks gathered to one,
and the bank account of a given person in the dif-
ferent banks can then be summed).
• Decentralized banking. In an intermediate system
of cooperation, each customer would still have only
one bank account in a given bank, but the bank
themselves would possess a bank account in other
banks. In this system, a bank A owes gold to its
customer, either because it has gold in its vault, but
also possibly because another bank B owes gold to
bank A. There could be an extreme case where a
given bank has no gold at all, but other banks owe
gold to it. In this decentralized system of banking,
all banks have to keep tracks of the claims they
have on other banks, and will for sure be reminded
what they owe. This can become very inefficient for
a large number of banks, because with this system
of mutual debts, we will recover the same struc-
ture as we found for payments before applying any
simplification. There will be several loops in the
graphs of debts and claims between the banks, and
the system will not be transparent enough.
• Centralized banking. By the same argumentation,
it can become optimal to simplify as much as possi-
ble the networks of debts and claims among banks,
that is to remove all the loops. In order for this
to be permanent, one would thus need to organize
the banks in a tree structure (with depth one for
simplicity), with one of the bank acting as a central
bank. Instead of all banks keeping positions with
all banks, the banks keep only a net position with
a central bank. For N banks the number of debts
scales then as N rather than N2 and this system is
more transparent, simpler to operate, control and
regulate. In a last round of cooperation, the banks
can decide to send their gold in the vault of the cen-
tral bank, and keep a claim on it, so as to optimize
the cost of gold keeping.
Note that in the case of independent banking and de-
centralized banking, there is actually a central structure
hidden through the possession of gold. First, in decen-
tralized banking, if all banks settle their debts, they are
back to independent banking, but all are united through
the claims they have on the commodity. So even if there
is no central bank, or no central system, the fact that
only one commodity is used is functionally close to a
system with a central bank. Gold acts as the center of
the system. The centralized banking system is just there
to avoid displacing physically heaps of gold through the
storage of everything in the central bank. We thus see
that the use of gold, with its physical exchange, is rooted
in the lack of a central organization, as it effectively re-
places it.
This sequence of cooperation is essentially what has
been followed in all developed countries from the inven-
tion of banking to the creation of central banks in the
very short period where gold was the counterpart of li-
abilities, that is around the XIXth century. The final
result after this phase of integration, is that we have ob-
tained a 2-tree (a tree of depth 2), with the central bank
at the root, the commercial banks at the first level, and
the customers on the leaves. We postpone a more general
discussion about the history and evolution of the mone-
tary structures to §II.F, as it happens to be much more
complex than this simple story.
D. Payments in a tree structure
Once the tree-structure of claims and debts has been
clearly identified, then payments are made extremely
easy. For nearly each payment between customers, there
is a unique loop created, because the payment at this
stage is the addition of a new debt. Indeed we remind
that a tree with N vertices, has N − 1 lines. When one
line is added as a result of a new debts/claim between cus-
tomer due to economic activity, there is necessarily one
loop (any graph with N vertices and N lines has neces-
sarily one loop). In order to maintain the tree structure
and to avoid direct claims between customers or between
banks the new loop needs to be removed. In order to
remove a loop we subtract the amount of the payment in
all lines of the loop, and this will remove automatically
the latest payment line. This is illustrated in Fig. 5.
It is of course similar to a simplification of a graph of
payments, except that now we have simplified a graph
of debts and claims (or assets and liabilities), that is a
graph of financial stock. For this we have considered that
a payment is a new pair of asset/liability which needs to
be incorporated in the graphs of stocks. At any time
step, there will be payments, and by successively incor-
porating them in the graphs of stocks, we effectively build
the graph of stock as the result of the temporal integra-
tion (in the mathematical sense of differential calculus)
of payments from an initial condition. Rephrased dif-
ferently, the graphs of payments at a given time is the
7time derivative of the graph of stocks at that given time.
Graphs of stock are the position of the monetary system,
and graphs of flows are their variation.
Note that the removal of the loop might involve the
full tree (if the customers are not in the same bank for
instance) but it can involve only a sub-tree (e.g. if the
customers are in the same bank). But in any case, a
payment requires to know what is the fundamental tree
structure of assets, in order to identify clearly the loop
that needs to be eliminated. This is why when a customer
a pays a customer b, it needs to provide its bank A with
the name of the bank B of customer b.
E. Gold withdrawal
A customer might as well ask for its asset to be con-
verted into central bank’s gold. Indeed under this model,
the central bank owns gold and owes it to commercial
bank who in turn owe it to customers. This can be
modelled in a graph representation by considering that
a customer has two bank accounts. One in a commer-
cial bank, and one which reflects its direct possession of
the gold commodity. There are several ways to represent
and thus to understand the operation. A simple one is to
consider that this is equivalent to the creation of a loop
which goes from the gold commodity to the customer and
then goes back to the gold commodity following the tree
of commercial banks. This is depicted in Fig. 6. One
can also consider that this is not a true loop. Indeed
we have represented the two different bank account on
the same vertex. If we had represented the two different
bank accounts as two different vertices (but now vertices
do not correspond identically to customers), then there
is no more loop and the operation is just the result of a
standard payment from one account to another. Either
we want to stick to a structure where there is no unsim-
plified loop, but the price to pay is that a customer might
have several bank accounts (one in gold, one in commer-
cial banks), or we do not fear to have loops as long as
they are not fundamental loop since all lines of the loop
are not denominated in the same thing (even though it
can be with the same unit of account).
F. From commodity to fiat money
Before we go any further, a comment is in order about
the history of monetary systems. The story we presented
for the integration of banks in a network is only a ped-
agogical story, and is by no means history. First it can-
not be history, because there is absolutely no reason for
the different countries and epochs to have followed the
same paths. One story cannot be history. Furthermore,
questioning the story of monetary arrangements is nearly
equivalent to questioning the origin of money and cur-
rencies. The presentation adopted here would imply, if
taken at face value, that there was first barter, then in a
FIG. 5 Top: a new short-term debt is added as a result of a
payment between customer 2 and customer 4. A cycle going
from customer 2 to customer 4 to bank 2 to the central bank to
ank 1 and back to customer 2 is created. Middle: we identified
the cycle which has to be removed. Bottom: after the cycle is
removed the tree structure is recovered, and the new balances
of debts/claims have been adjusted. Note that the arrows do
not depict payments (flows) but assets/liabilities which are
stocks.
sophistication, there was exchange of commodities, and
only after came a mild form of fiat money as a claim
8FIG. 6 Top: as a result of the requirement that the customer
should hold directly a part of its wealth in the commodity,
there is now an irreducible loop in the monetary system. In-
deed as a result, the customer holds directly gold but also
holds claims on gold through the commercial banks. Bottom:
an intermediate requirement would be for the customer to
hold directly a claim on the central bank. In that case, given
that the customers has also two banks accounts, one which is
directly at the central bank, and one in its commercial bank,
this is also equivalent to the creation of a loop. Bank accounts
at the central bank take the form of paper bank notes (which
are thus anonymous), and this operation is equivalent to cash
withdrawal.
on commodities (gold) toward banks. This story implies
that there is a positive historic movement toward liquid-
ity, but where the value of claims is backed by gold. This
point of view is essentially the metallist point of view or
the commodity theory of money. If this might have been
true for some societies at some times, there is no proof
that this is has been a general feature.
Actually it is argued by Graeber (2011) that this is
rather the exception in history, and that the most generic
type of money is credit money which finds its origins in
the quantification of moral debts in units of accounts.
The gold standard money appears in that perspective
as an exception driven by the industrial revolution, and
ended in 1971. These general ideas are actually not new,
as they are rooted in the chartalist description of the ori-
gin of money, where the unit of account for the debts is
actually set by the state. The chartalist description of
money dates back from Mitchell-Innes (Mitchell-Innes,
1913) who emphasized that money is a standard of de-
ferred payment. As the state spends in a chosen and
arbitrary unit of account, it also sets that this unit of
account should be the standard unit of account for debt
repayment, as all individual debts toward society which
take the form of taxes have to be redeemed in that state
unit of account, which is a pure fiat money. In that case,
the fiat money does not derive its value from the mar-
ket as a commodity, but rather is credit money whose
value is initiated by the sovereign states. These ideas
have been further developed by Lerner (1947) and Knapp
(1924) and are currently revived under the name neo-
chartalism (Wray, 2004).
In order to shift from a commodity money to a pure
fiat money we just need the central bank to give up on
its commitment to convert its IOUs into gold. There is a
vault full of gold, but the key has been lost. In that case,
any customer can ask for its assets to be converted into
central bank’s IOUs but not into gold (on Fig. 6, only the
bottom configuration is possible). The chartalist theory
of money argues that everything would behave as usual as
long as the state continues to tax in that unit of account.
It thus argues that taxation is a sufficient condition to
impose that the state IOUs are the unit of accounts for
debt repayments. The true amount of commodity inside
the state issued coins does not matter, as long as the
state has the monopoly on coinage and the ability to tax
in this unit. The power of states lies in their ability to
tax and neo-chartalists thus refer to such a fiat money
system as a sovereign currency.
Forstater (2003) [see also Cottrell et al. (2009)] has
recently explored the monetization in colonies by colo-
nizing countries, and showed that it was performed ex-
actly following that logic. The colonizing countries have
spent their currency in the colonies, and enforced its use
by promising to tax in that same currency, so as to en-
force the power of the colonizing country. When the US
landed in Europe, they wanted to impose such a char-
talist monetization, and it was strongly opposed by the
French government in exile until this idea was given up,
precisely on the ground that this would amount to colo-
nization (de Gaulle, 1959) and not liberation.
This controversy about the nature of money is ex-
tremely pregnant in the macroeconomic debate. But as
we have argued already, there is no unique theory of
money. There have been societies at some given time
that have evolved using a commodity money, and other
9societies at other times that have developed a chartalist
system. In general, one could say that whenever a state
collapses, the corresponding society reverts to a commod-
ity money, whereas when a society self-organizes around
a strong central power, it shifts toward a chartalist sys-
tem based on debt money initiated by the state ability
to tax (Graeber, 2011). Given that the gold convertibil-
ity of the Bretton-Woods agreement has been abandoned
in 1971, there is no doubt that the current international
system is a chartalist system. If this is still debated, it
is only because this can be considered as being rather
recent from a historical point of view. We explore in
greater details the debt nature of money in § II.I.
G. Paper money and cash withdrawal
For our purpose here, which is to understand the gen-
eral structures of monetary systems, it is sufficient to
remember that we have achieved a pyramidal, or a tree
structure of claims and debts. But the question is then
to know what is owed, when there is no more commodity
to owe. At least what is preserved is the possibility to
transform a claim on a commercial bank, to a claim on
the central bank. This is what is done each time one with-
draws banknotes. It is as if one transfered money from a
bank account at a commercial bank to a bank account at
the central bank, with the additional sophistication that
the bank account at the central bank for customers is
materialized in paper notes, and is thus anonymous. So
in a sense, once the convertibility to gold is removed, the
ultimate form is not a commodity, but a paper printed
by the central bank, which is as good as gold.
Again this operation is equivalent to the introduction
of a loop as explained in Fig. 6. It is very similar to a
withdrawal in gold, except that now the ultimate form
preferred by the customer is the IOU of the central bank.
This is usually called cash and takes the form of paper
bank notes for customers. A payment between two cus-
tomers using these paper bank notes, is equivalent to
a very simple loop which is actually just a triangle be-
tween the two customers and the central bank, but as it
is anonymous, it needs not be registered by the central
bank. Indeed, the peculiarity of paper bank notes is that
it breaks the two sided accounts which is otherwise cen-
tral in the monetary system. That is for any arrow, an
asset/liability relation, both the asset and liability sides
have a written record somewhere of their relation. How-
ever with paper bank notes, only the one possessing the
asset keeps track of its possession of the asset. On the
central bank side, only the total number of bank notes
is kept into the ledgers. Anonymity and flexibility comes
however with less security.
Would everybody ask to convert its assets into IOUs
of the central bank, if the central bank allows for it, ev-
erybody will end up with its assets in the form of central
bank IOUs. In practice however, the central bank IOUs
for customers take the form of coins and notes, and not
formal bank account in ledgers. But if everybody was
allowed to hold a proper checking account at the central
bank, and not just paper money, we would in fact reach a
very simple system for payments. That would be equiv-
alent to the merging, or consolidation - see next section
- of all the commercial banks with the central bank. In-
deed, this would be a simple 1-tree structure, with the
central bank at the root of the tree, and all customers
placed below it at the first level.
H. Conservation laws
The concept of oriented graphs, with local conserva-
tion of charge has long been known in physics (Kirchhoff,
1847). It is used in electric circuits, with conservation of
current at internal vertices, or in Feynman graphs, with
conservation of momentum at internal interaction ver-
tices. The same concept applies here to graphs of mone-
tary arrangements. At every vertex, the sum of all lines
should vanish. Or if we separate into assets (claims) and
liabilities (debts), the sum of assets at one vertex should
be equal to the liabilities of that vertex. The assets are
similar to positive charges whereas liabilities are similar
to negative charges, and vertices have to be financially
neutral. The double entry book-keeping of any company
or bank is thus designed to preserve this neutrality. Fol-
lowing this analogy, every arrow (called an oriented edge
in graph theory) joining two vertices is similar to a charge
displacement or a polarization, as it is a liability on one
side (a negative charge) and an asset on the other side
(a positive charge). This means that any immediate pay-
ment or any new debt/claim relation conserves the finan-
cial charge, as it is simply a displacement.
The major consequence is that we can consolidate any
subsector of the monetary system. Let us draw a closed
line in the monetary graphs. This define a region of the
monetary system. We assume at first that there are no
customers sitting inside. Since all vertices inside this re-
gion are by construction neutral, and since we can ignore
the internal financial relations as they net out, we can
replace the subregion by a single vertex whose assets and
liabilities are given by the incoming and outgoing lines of
the region. In practice, it means that if we do not need to
consider the internal financial structure inside the region,
we can ignore it and simplify the graph. In accounting,
this is called a consolidation and helps in reading the
structure of graphs. One can for instance decide to con-
solidate the financial sector, and thus to reduce all banks
to just one bank like in Fig. 7. Actually nearly all inter-
esting graphs are consolidated, so as to show a specific
feature of the whole system.
I. Going into debt
What if a customer sees his asset going negative? Af-
ter a payment, nothing prevents this in principle. As a
10
FIG. 7 Top: we identify a closed curve for a consolidation of
banks located inside. Bottom: the result of the consolidation.
result, it is not the customer which has a claim on its
bank, but then it is the bank which has a claim on the
customer since the arrow is not going from the bank to
the customer, but in the opposite direction. And we see
that this would then be tempting to make more pay-
ments than the assets owned, and this infinitely3. There
are several possibilities to prevent this from happening.
The simplest one is to simply forbid spending if it leads
to negative assets. This is clearly too simple, and there
are several reasons for allowing people to go into debt. In
the Marxist analysis of capitalism, we need for instance
to spend first by borrowing in order to buy materials,
components, in order to create afterwards more sophis-
ticated products, sell them, create a profit, and finally
reimburse the loan. So the possibility of going into debt
is rooted in the creation of wealth. The usual solution
to allow for people to go into debt, but still keeping con-
trol of it, is to charge interests. There are several ways
one can charge interests. But they are all based on the
3 In physics, when quantities are not bounded by below, bad things
happen, and ghosts haunt the theory.
same principle which is to lend an amount and to ask for
a higher repayment on an agreed future time delay (the
maturity). The difference between the initial amount lent
S, and the repaid amount can be converted into an in-
terest rate I using usual composition of interests for the
duration of the maturity D. It can sometimes be more
convenient to work with a log-interest rate defined by
i ≡ log(1 + I). The amount to be repaid is then S× eD i.
Of course if I and D are small, the amount to be re-
paid is approximately S(1 + Di) ' S(1 + DI). A more
complicated loan can always be considered as a set of
independent loans (e.g. for a mortgage where the repay-
ment has to be made every month in say 240 month,
it can be considered as the addition of 240 independent
loans), all with the same interest rate, but with differ-
ent maturities, which have been arranged such that the
repayments are always kept constant. For the sake of
understanding the nature of debts and interests, we will
thus always ignore complex schemes like this and con-
sider a single maturity for an amount borrowed. In our
graph representation, we now need to indicate a debt by
(S, i,D) where S is current amount, i the interest rate
and D its maturity (the time delay with which it must be
reimbursed). Equivalently, one could decide to represent
the current amount owed, the maturity, and the higher
value at maturity. After every unit of time, (S, i,D) is
replaced by (S × (1 + i), i,D − 1), and when the matu-
rity becomes null, it is transformed into an immediate
payment of amount S × (1 + i)D whose loop needs to be
removed as described in § II.D.
So far the IOUs of the bank, once we have removed the
reference to an underlying gold convertibility, are just the
promise to convert them into IOUs of the central bank.
And no matter at what time this conversion is made, this
will be realized with the same amount of central bank
IOUs. These financial assets are equivalent to interest-
less debts. By introducing the possibility to have debts
which bear interests, that is for which the issuers of the
debts is committed to reimburse more in the future, we
see that we will have a mixed system in which we have
tow categories of IOUs. In the first category, we have the
IOUs of the central bank, and the IOUs of commercial
banks which are promises to deliver IOUs of the central
banks, and in the second category we have the IOUs of
customers who have borrowed and which promise to re-
alize a payment in the future using IOUs of the first cat-
egory. Throughout this paper we will make a distinction
between money and net money when referring to these
IOUs:
• money consists in the financial assets, and it is the
reflection of IOUs of commercial banks and of the
central bank toward customers;
• net money consists in money from which we sub-
tract the liabilities, that is it is made of financial
assets minus financial liabilities, or net assets.
All amounts are expressed in the same unit of account,
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e.g. the national unit of account (e.g. $ or e) which is
the one of the central bank.
J. Loans and deposits: hens and eggs
An everlasting debate is about knowing whether or not
deposits allow customers to borrow, or if it is because
customer borrow that there are deposits. This question
is reminiscent of the debate about who was first there
between the egg and the hen. We will tell two stories,
one where it is the egg in this section, and one where it
is the hen in the next section, which will then allow us to
conclude that these stories are harmless as long as they
help thinking the possible underlying mechanisms, but
they are not fundamental at all.
When a banker grants a loan, it is equivalent to the
addition of two arrows going in opposite directions. One
is going from the commercial bank to the borrower and
corresponds to an increase of its assets (of its money),
which is decided by the banker. But in exchange of this,
the other arrow is the debt going from the borrower to
the bank (see Fig. 8). It has the same amount, but it
bears interest up to a maturity, meaning that the bor-
rower is committed to repay back the loan and the in-
terest associated to it. Of course the borrower has his
own agenda, which is to spend what he has borrowed by
paying another customer (say of the same bank for sim-
plicity). We see that the total of the assets possessed by
a customer in his bank has increased, but of course the
total of its liabilities has increased as well at the same
time by the same amount. Even after the borrowing cus-
tomer has paid the other customer of the same bank, if
we sum all their assets and liabilities toward the bank, it
has remained the same. But since we have decided to call
money the financial assets of customers, and not the net
assets, we can say that there has been money creation
as a result of the act of borrowing. So we must always
remember that there is no net creation of assets because
if we have increased the assets, we have also increased
the liabilities. In other words, if we were to consolidate
the customers into only one customer, then the total net
assets, that is the total debt of the banking sector toward
the consolidated customer is unchanged. If we consider
only money and not just net money, that is if we consider
only the financial assets of customers, we are looking at
the polarization of the money sector, which results in the
displacement of money up to the point where there is
negative money, that is liabilities of the customers. This
is often called the endogenous nature of money and we
discuss it further in § V.F.
To conclude, in this story, it is the loan which has
made the deposit. It has created money but since it was
just there to polarize into equal amount of assets and
liabilities it has not created any net money. We can also
see that some simple fundamental questions arise. What
if all customers with positive assets ask to convert these
assets into the central bank IOUs? What if the borrower
FIG. 8 Left: the customer contracts first a loan for an amount
S, with interest rate i, with maturity D. We showed in dashed
arrow, the payment he intends to make with the amount bor-
rowed. Right: after payment to the other customer for a
service or an investment, he is left with the same asset, but
has an extra liability. The other customer has an increased
asset. There is a creation of assets and liability, but both
compensate. In this story, the loan has preceded the creation
of a deposit.
pays somebody in a different bank and not in the same
bank? Before answering these questions, we will answer
and even more important question. What if the borrower
fails to reimburse?
K. Net worth of bankers
Indeed, the borrower thinks that he will be able to
repay in a future because he is going to exchange his
work against money, that in turn he will use to reimburse.
There are then obvious reasons why the borrower might
not be able to work to find the money needed. This
ranges from losing his job, having an accident, or simply
being dead, among many other reasons.
From a graphical point of view this would be equivalent
to a unilateral removal of the debt from a customer to its
bank. However, our formalism starts to be inconsistent if
we allow for such possibility, because at the bank vertex,
there will be no more neutrality since the removal of the
debt (which is an asset for the bank) would mean that
it is no more there to compensate for the corresponding
liability (in Fig. 9, one can say that the corresponding
liability is toward the customer which has been paid by
the borrower). In order to guarantee the neutrality of all
bank vertices in a graphical representation of a monetary
system, one thus needs to consider the net worth of the
banker.
So far the bank was just a node or a vertex in the
graph structure. Maybe it needed some ressources to op-
erate, that is it needs a little workforce of clerks to keep
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track of all the assets entering into it and all the liabili-
ties exiting, but if we ignore this, it is essentially empty,
and is just an accounting artefact. Now, in reality, if a
borrower fails to reimburse, it would be the banker who
should do it for him. This mean that the banker, the
physical person4, is one special customer of the bank. In
order to differentiate him from other customers, it is use-
ful to draw him on a different level, but formally it is
similar to a customer. We will to refer to it as the bank
net worth. If a customer defaults, then instead of just re-
moving the corresponding line of the debt, we will then
consider that it is the banker which (unvoluntarily) pays
the borrower, and that once the loop of the payment is
removed from the graph, it is equivalent to remove the
debt of the customer, but also to reduce the assets of the
banker, that is to reduce its net worth. Conversely, when
the borrower reimburses but also pays interests, it does
so to the banker and this means that the bank net worth
increases by the same amount. With this notation, the
bank vertex is by construction always neutral, and the
risk of defaulting together with the benefit of charging
interests, are reported on the bank net worth. This bank
net worth might be at the beginning zero, but laws might
ask this to be a positive quantity from the beginning. In
that case its value would be given by the capital which
has been brought by the newcomer. A new banker, after
asking the authorization of being a banker, will ask to
convert its assets in commercial banks into direct cen-
tral bank IOUs, and will use this as a positive initial net
worth. Then he will start lending to customers who will
both owe and have money in the bank, and this by cre-
ating assets and liabilities out of thin air. Formally it is
not lending its initial capital, but rather uses it for safety
reasons in case some borrowers would default. Any loss
is incurred on the net worth and thus is taken from the
initial capital invested in the bank. Banking comes with
a risk, and the hope is to gain more interests in the net
worth than what is lost by defaulting borrowers.
4 More realistically the physical group of persons made of stock-
holders. But throughout this paper we symbolically describe
these as the banker.
FIG. 9 Left: customer 3 has asked for its assets to be con-
verted into central bank IOUs. Right: he then uses these
central bank assets as an initial capital to create a bank and
starts creating loans out of thin air. He might also receive
deposits from new customers (not shown on the graph).
This notion of net worth is the same as the usual no-
tion of net worth for companies, among which banks are
just a special type. Indeed, any company can be consid-
ered as an abstract vertex, which has a financial position
with respect to the rest of the system (e.g. clients owe it
money and it owes money to suppliers). It also has a net
worth, which is the sum of the initial capital brought by
the creator, on which benefits have accumulated (this is
similar to the interests charged by the bankers, which are
just a given type of service). From a legal point of view,
stockholders all possess a fraction of this net worth. The
stockholders can ask to leave it as it is, to spend it in
investment, or to transfer a subpart onto their own bank
account, and this happens when a coupon is paid.
The notation of consolidation has to be extended to
take into account the net worth of banks or companies.
The net worth in a sense is nothing but the total charge of
a bank or of a company, that we have put outside of the
central vertex, to comply with our habits of neutrality
at vertices. If we draw a closed region that we want to
consolidate, we just need to add all the values of the
net worths which are inside, and they will add up to the
equivalent net worth, as when we integrate the electric
charge density in a given region in order to compute the
total electric charge in it.
L. Hens and eggs revisited
We cannot ignore the possibility that individuals bor-
row directly from other individuals. Understood in a
broad sense, this is common if we see a company borrow-
ing to individuals, as individuals (the stockholders) bor-
rowing to individuals. As mentioned above, the wealth
of a company is contained in its net worth which in turn
is possessed by the pool of stockholders. So it is suffi-
cient for simplicity to examine the case of an individual
borrowing to another individual. In that case it is in
appearance different from the hen and eggs story that
we have talked about when banks have created a pair
deposit/debt out of thin air. But as we shall see, it is
just apparently different. As we revisit the problem ex-
posed in Tobin (1963), we find that the representation
in graphs actually clarifies the explanations about the
monetary arrangements which are made at each step.
An individual will only be able to lend what he has.
Lending will take the form of a payment to the borrower,
and the borrower and the lender would agree on the debt,
meaning that we also need to draw in our graphs the
debts agreed upon, with amount, interest rate and ma-
turity. This looks like the first step of the bank lending.
We write two arrows going in opposite directions, one for
the payment of the lender, and one for the debt recog-
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nition. The difference with the bank story is that the
payment needs to be settled by a loop removal as a usual
payment, whereas in the case of the bank, it was directly
in the tree of the monetary system. If both the lender
and the borrower are in the same bank, the resulting sit-
uation is depicted in Fig. 10 (left plot). As a final step,
the lender might find it extremely risky to have a debt of
another customer, and might decide that bankers are pre-
cisely made for taking such risks. And he also would like
to possess assets with shorter maturity. So he is going to
sell this debt to the banker. The banker in turn will be
willing to accept only if there is something to compen-
sate the risk. As a compensation, he is going to ask for
a part of the interest rate or a part of the amount owed,
or both. As a final position, we have now reached a sit-
uation where the borrower needs to reimburse the bank
which needs to reimburse the first lender. But the banks
transfers only a part of the reimbursement and keeps the
difference in the net worth. And of course at some point
the borrower might perform a payment, for instance to
the lender, but it could be to anybody, as his plan was
to borrow in order to spend. The final situation is sim-
ilar to situations where customers have all their assets
in accounts for which the bank serves an interest. And
the banker earns its life by the difference between the
interest it asks on its assets and the interest it serves on
its liabilities. Following this analysis without considering
this extreme case, it is tempting to drape words around
it, in saying that some customer savings have been used
to generate loans for other customers, and the interme-
diation of the banker is retributed by the difference in
interest rates. In that case, it is customary to call this a
financial institution and not a bank, since in this point
of view, it serves only as an intermediation between cus-
tomers who lend to each other. But we must be clear
that the initial situation of Fig. 10 (left plot) which was
added for the purpose of our nice story, actually never ex-
ists, as only the final situation is realized, blurring even
more the difference between a bank and a financial in-
stitution. The only real difference would be that, once
the loan has been used to pay a customer outside of the
bank/institution, a commercial bank traditionally owes
above, that is to the central bank, what it is owed from
below by the borrowers, whereas a financial institution
owes below (to the savers) what it is owed from below by
the borrowers. Since this requires to describe interbank
payments, we discuss this below in §II.N and illustrate
it in Fig. 12. Additionally, one should not forget that
for a financial institution the maturity of the liabilities
toward the customers is in general much smaller (1 or 2
years) than the maturity of the assets it holds (5 or 10
years) (Minsky, 1992), so that the customers might at
some point decide to withdraw their assets. This would
force the institution to borrow from above (to banks or
to the central bank), and the financial institution would
then have a balance sheet resembling the one of a bank.
In order to gain an additional insight on the problem,
one can also consider a simpler case, where we do not re-
fer at all to the first customer, and consider that it is ac-
tually the banker who is lending what is on its net worth.
If we follow in details the different graphical situations,
then at the end we find simply that this is equivalent
to the simple situation where the banker keeps entirely
the interest for him. Before lending, his net worth was a
claim on the central bank bearing no interest, and after
lending, when the money lent is spent outside the bank,
the net worth has not changed value but it has changed
of nature, as it was replaced by a claim on the customer
to whom he has lent with interest. In this extreme case
where the banker has kept the whole benefit of the inter-
est rate for him because he used his own net worth for
lending, we see again that the final situation is in every
respect similar to the case where the banker has created
the loan and the debt out of thin air. It is completely
equivalent to saying that he is lending his net worth and
receives a claim on a debt in exchange, or that he created
a loan and a deposit out of thin air.
So the conclusion is that the order does not really mat-
ter. As long as we look at time scales which are not too
small, the effective theory is the same, as the final situa-
tion is similar. In this second story we have just found a
nice way to explain why interests can be served on saving
accounts, but this could equally have been added inde-
pendently.
If we really want to resolve the apparent paradox of
the moment of money creation (the hen and the egg), we
need to realize that the right moment in which money is
created is when a double arrow is written, one for an im-
mediate debt with no interest and one for the debt. When
a bank grants a loan, then at the very moment when it
increases the balance of the borrower, it also recognizes
an exactly compensating long term debt. It is at this
very moment that we should consider money is created.
Then when the borrower is actually spending, we are al-
ready beyond money creation, and the problem is to get
it accepted. On Fig. 8 we have clearly written this status
in the first graph. However, for the second story we have
not written in the first graph the immediate debt of the
lender, but rather we have started directly with the result
of the loop simplification which follows immediately af-
ter. We should instead consider that this moment is the
creation of money. With this formal agreement, money
creation is not made before or after a loan. It is made
exactly when the loan is made, when the compensation
between an immediate and a long term debt is written.
This is just a formal solution to the apparent paradox,
nothing more. What is important to take home, is that
no net money is created, whatever the process considered.
Even though this debate might appear extremely sim-
ple once rephrased in small graphs, I should insist that
this debate still permeates the economic literature, and
even accounting rules insofar make the distinction be-
tween banks and financial institutions. When the first
ones lend first out of thin air, the second ones are sup-
posed to lend the deposits of their customers to other
customers. But in practice the final result is completely
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similar, especially if banks start to serve an interest on
the deposits5. One might argue that a possible difference
lies in the fact that the financial institution cannot lend
more than the deposits it has received. But the amounts
which are lent are spent, and eventually it increases the
deposits and thus the possible loans made out of it, so the
limit is just an apparent one. Furthermore, as mentioned
above, the savers might withdraw their assets because
they have a shorter maturity.
In practice, financial institutions guarantee the pay-
ment of an interest once an amount is transferred to an
account in the institution. They then look for possible
ways to lend, in order to ensure that the net worth will
receive enough interests, so as to enable this retribution.
In that sense the deposits create the loans for financial
institutions, because they trigger the need for the institu-
tion to actually realize a loan, so as to be able to pay the
interests owed. A famous French example is the Livret
A institution. Customers transfer sums between their
deposits in commercial bank to this saving account in
the institution. Independently the institution looks for
ways to lend money, usually for construction schemes at
higher interest rates. Since construction schemes are usu-
ally not enough, it then needs to find other ways to lend
the money which it has received. The final situation is
that there are liabilities for the institution on which it
serves a small interest rate, and then there are assets
which are the loans made, on which it receives a higher
interest, just like for a usual bank.
FIG. 10 Left: position after the first customer has lent an
amount S to the second customer of the bank. Right: position
after the banker has bought the credit owed to the lender,
taking part of the interest in exchange for taking the risk.
5 The only question which matters is to know what would happen
if the net worth of the institution goes negative, and for this we
should rather look at the size of the institution than at its legal
nature, to try to guess the reaction of the central bank, that is
to guess whether or not it will step in as the lender of last resort.
Now what is interesting in the story where one cus-
tomer lends to another one, at least in the story that we
have told, is that there was a stage in which the debt
of the borrower was directly to the lender, and not indi-
rectly through the bank vertex as when the banker has
decided to buy the credit. Of course these operations
are agreed upon from the beginning, so either situation
might happen. If it is clear that the debt will remain a
direct debt from a borrower to a lender, then what we
have is the issuing of a bond. If the customers are ac-
tually considered as companies, the situation is the one
of a company that issues a bond to finance e.g. an in-
vestment, and no bank wants to take the risk in its net
worth. Or from another point of view, the lender is will-
ing to fully take the risk in order to ask for a higher
interest rate. Given that this debt was not integrated
in the fundamental tree structure, its nature starts to
shift. For instance, if the debt goes through the bank
vertex, the lender has a claim on the financial institution
that he can ask to transfer to another institution, or to
convert into central bank IOUs. But when the claim is
directly onto the borrower, the only hope is to find some-
body willing to buy it, that is to exchange it for IOUs of
banks. This is the point in our graphs where we will start
to consider that there are different levels of debts. Those
which are always transferable or convertible into central
bank IOUs are part of the fundamental tree structure of
the monetary arrangement. But the assets which are di-
rectly corresponding to the debt of a borrower, should
be drawn in a different color to emphasize their different
nature. The IOU of a bank is as good as the central bank
IOU, because there is a commitment to always swap one
for another. But the IOU of an individual or a company
is not as good because there is no commitment to perform
such exchange.
As a comment, note that sometimes a bank reverses its
role of taking risks, and instead sells the credits (Wray,
2010). That is it starts by granting loans, creating liabil-
ities out of thin air, but then sells the credit to customers
so that the final situation is the left plot of Fig. 10. In
that case, the customer is fully taking the risks and does
not benefit from the lender of last resort insurance pro-
vided by the central bank. The bank only makes a small
profit for charging the service of intermediation. Every-
thing happens as if the customer was a banker, with the
difference that quite often he is not even aware of it, since
it is a pension fund which has bought the credit for him.
This was widespread practice before 2008 as the banks
sold credits, hidden in asset backed securities to individu-
als who were only contributing to their retirement plans.
M. Bank runs and the nature of money
What if we reintroduce for a while the possibility that
eventually, the central bank IOUs are the promise to pay
a commodity (gold). In a monetary arrangement, then
thanks to conservation of charge at each vertex, the sum
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of the leaves of the tree, that is the sum of IOUs pos-
sessed by all customers, reflects all the IOUs issued by
the central bank. But it is the total sum of leaves, in-
cluding assets (claims on the banks) and liabilities (debt
toward the banks) which is the net money and reflects
the total commodity in the central bank’s vault. If there
is no debt at all, and customers have only assets, then ev-
erybody can ask at the same time to convert their wealth
into gold. The entire tree would vanish, and we would
be back to a situation where everybody has a share of
the commodity. But if we allow for debt among the cus-
tomers then we must be careful with the fact that money
(positive assets) is not net money. If we allow all positive
assets to be converted to gold, then we have more claims
on gold than gold itself, and the system fails. How is it
possible if we have been so careful to ensure charge con-
servation at every stage of our monetary system? It is
extremely simple and reflects the true nature of money
with respect to net money. Money is now partially claims
on the gold of the central bank, and claims on the debts
of the borrower. It has shifted from its commodity na-
ture to its debt nature. In order to see this we need to
look at the outside vertices of the monetary structure.
This includes the assets of the customers but also their
liabilities to the system. And these debts are not avail-
able immediately since the borrowers have to work to be
able to pay. This is illustrated in Fig. 11. So essentially
money is now partially a right to get gold, and partially a
right to ask for the borrowers to work by purchasing their
workforce. Indeed when a customer with positive assets
pays a borrower in exchange of work, the reduction of
the loop reduces the assets of the payer, and reduces the
liabilities of the borrower. Again there is no net money
destruction. However there is money destruction.
It is because of this incompatibility between money
and net money, the fact that the first one is only par-
tially a claim on the assets of the central bank, but also
partially a claim on the future workforce of borrowers,
that convertibility to gold must be abandoned. By allow-
ing customers to go into debt, but by incorporating these
debts in the monetary structure, we have shifted the na-
ture of the IOUs, in an irreversible manner which calls for
the end of convertibility. Conversely, if no bank had ac-
cepted to polarize money, that is to generate endogenous
money, and if loans where made by customers to cus-
tomers in the form of bonds that would not be encapsu-
lated into the tree structure, then the IOUs of the banks
would still be claims on the central bank gold reserves.
One would have two types of currencies. One would be
the IOUs of banks which are eventually redeemable in
central bank assets (gold), and then the IOUs of indi-
viduals that we could also exchange to settle payments.
In some cases we would exchange claims on gold, and in
other cases claims on future workforce, but we should be
aware that nothing guarantees that they would be traded
at par. By incorporating the loans, or at least a major
part of the loans in the fundamental tree structure, we
have obtained a much more liquid system, at the price of
FIG. 11 Left: the total assets of customers are reflected par-
tially by the gold held at the central bank, and partially by
the debts of the borrowers. Right: if customers ask to convert
their assets into gold, they cannot convert all of it, since part
of these assets are the debts of the borrowers. At some point,
the central bank needs to stop the convertibility.
abandoning the convertibility. As we will see further, the
same process happens in currency which are pegged to an
external currency. The external currency acts like gold.
Allowing to convert money instead of just net money in
the external currency, contains the same internal con-
tradiction leading to an unavoidable breakdown of the
currency peg.
N. Interbank payments
Up to now we have considered only customers who
would pay each other easily as they have accounts in the
same bank. What if after borrowing, a customer spends
by paying someone in another bank? To find the answer
we follow the same procedure. The payment creates a
loop in the fundamental tree structure, and it is the can-
cellation of this loop which results in the actual payment.
But if we do this, we realize that the bank of the bor-
rower will then be possibly in debt toward the central
bank. If it is not the case then there is absolutely no
problem and the assets of the first bank at the central
bank have decreased while those of the second bank have
increased.
However if the first bank has not enough central bank
money, there are two possibilities. i) Either the central
bank allows for the first bank to be in debt, and it will
charge interests for this. Then the central banks acts with
banks as a bank acts with its customers. This is not a
surprise since this is the purpose of the underlying tree
structure; ii) or the central bank does not allow for such
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possibility. Then instead of removing the loop through
the central bank, that is instead of settling the debt of the
first bank to the second bank though the central bank,
the second bank has to accept the direct debt of the first
bank. After a while we are then back to a system in
which all banks have debts toward other banks, in what
looks very much like a decentralized system of banks.
The interbank payments are depicted in Fig. 12.
The way the monetary system works is actually a mix
of the two. First, the central bank guarantees the pay-
ment of an interest on the deposits (possibly zero) of
commercial banks at the central bank. But it also guar-
antees that the commercial banks can borrow from the
central bank at the discount rate which is of course higher
than the rate paid on deposits. This means that no com-
mercial bank would loan its excess of central bank money
at a rate lower than the deposit rate, and at a rate larger
than the discount rate. The central bank thus defines
a corridor of rates in which the commercial banks can
negotiate interbank loans. The rate at which they loan
to each other on a daily basis is the interbank rate, and
it is this rate that the central bank tries to control with
its monetary policy (see § III.B). The discount rate is
just meant to safeguard against a dysfunctional interbank
market and guarantee that commercial banks can always
borrow to settle interbank payments.
We realize that the power lies in the institution which
allows to be indebted. When a bank goes into debt, it
has to borrow from the central bank under the conditions
set by the central bank. So in a tree structure, we have a
hierarchy in the structure and those at the upper vertices
hold a form of power on those situated below. The power
to allow the others to go into debt is far from insignifi-
cant. We will see that in the international system, this
tree structure still appears with strong currencies at the
top of the tree, benefiting from the right to grant loans.
III. INTRODUCING A SOVEREIGN STATE
So far we have considered an extremely simple system
in which we have banks and customers, and a central
bank. Companies where not mentioned so far, but they
can be incorporated easily. Since we have shown that
gold convertibility cannot be maintained when credit is
included into the system, and given that it has now been
abandoned for all currencies, we will assume in the re-
mainder of this article that there is no more gold conver-
sion possible. We thus considerate only a system with
pure fiat money. However, until now we have ignored the
presence of a sovereign state and this is much more cru-
cial. Or at least, we have only considered its ability to
organize the banks around a central bank and to organize
the conditions of borrowing (the monetary policy), but
have completely ignored its ability to borrow, tax and
spend, that is we have ignored the chartalist nature of
money in our graphs. It is however for this part that the
graph representation becomes most advantageous. We
FIG. 12 Top left: the banker, who has already received the
deposits of some customers, grants a loan to a given customer
and writes the double arrow, one for money creation and the
other one for the debt. Top right: the customer spends in
another bank, and if the amount lent is less than the deposits
received earlier by the bank, it still holds a claim on the cen-
tral bank. This way of lending falls in the category of the
financial institutions, has it has mainly assets and liabilities
below.Bottom left: the banker grants a loan, but has never
received any deposit from any saver. It makes sure to ask
for an interest rate higher than the discount rate. Bottom
middle: the borrower spends in another bank, and in order
to settle the payment the bank had to borrow at the central
bank at the discount rate. This is typical of bank lending as
it has assets below and liabilities above. Bottom right: since
the second bank now has a lot of central money which bears
no interest, it might prefer to lend directly to the first bank
this excess at an interest rate lower than the discount rate,
so that the first bank owes directly to the second bank and
not to the central bank. In all cases, we have not shown the
net worth of the bankers for simplicity and we have assumed
a simple case in which they vanish, but the will evolve as the
repayments due plus interests are carried out.
will first develop our formalism to represent the presence
of the state in its full form, and this will then allow to
discuss at length the budgetary tools of sovereign states.
A. Public spending and public borrowing
1. Borrowing methods
The state has a bank account at the central bank, and
in all literature this is referred to as the Treasury. It feeds
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this bank account, which is thus held in central bank
money, by forcing the payment of taxes by customers
(which in that occasion are called taxpayers). Any tax-
payer, creates a new loop when he is asked to pay the
Treasury, and by the usual removal of the loop described
in § II.D, the Treasury account at the central bank in-
creases, whereas the customer’s account and the account
of its bank at the central bank decreases. It is formally
equivalent to paying somebody after withdrawing cash.
The customer converts its assets into central bank IOUs
and gives them (he pays his taxes) to the Treasury. From
the chartalist perspective, we can say that this taxation
drains central bank IOUs out of the private sector. We
remind that in the chartalist interpretation, it is the fact
that eventually taxes are paid in central bank IOUs which
makes the central bank IOUs widely acceptable as the
main means of payment. Asking to pay tax liabilities
in central bank IOUs is certainly a sufficient condition
for its acceptance as the central means of payment since
the customers need to ensure that they hold enough of
these IOUs, either directly from the central bank in paper
bank notes, or indirectly by holding IOUs of commercial
banks, to be able to pay their taxes.
By contrast, public spending goes from the Treasury
account to individuals, e.g. by paying the salaries of civil
servants or through social spending. Now when the state
wants to tax more than it spends, this is easy. It is hard
for taxpayers, but there is no technical reason why this
could not happen. However, if the state wants to spend
more than what it taxes, we need more. There are several
possibilities that we are going to review in details
• Money printing: This is the easiest possibility. It
consists in increasing unilaterally the amount on
the Treasury account. If there is no more convert-
ibility this is fine, because the IOUs of the central
bank are not exchangeable with anything anyway.
If there is still convertibility, this might be equiv-
alent to a debasement of all IOUs. But anyway
we have already seen that as soon as we allow for
debt, and this debt is encapsulated into the mone-
tary system, convertibility should be abandoned.
• Directly borrowing from the central bank: Another
possibility would be not to print money, that is to
put it on the Treasury account out of thin air, but
to lend it to the Treasury. This is exactly as when
money is printed, except that now the state also
issues a bond that it gives to the central bank, and
if it feels like it, it might decide to add a matu-
rity and an interest rate. Such a situation can only
really work if both the Treasury and the central
bank obey the same sovereign power, so that the
state actually controls both sides of the deal. The
consequence is that if this is the case, then it can
borrow as much as it wants. This is fundamentally
different from a country borrowing in a foreign cur-
rency, and it is the essence of a sovereign currency.
And when it needs to reimburse, it can just borrow
again what is needed. This would be equivalent to
writing in red ink on the bond issued ten years ear-
lier that it should be extended another ten years.
Eventually, as the bonds remain and are extended
or replaced by similar bonds, this is equivalent to
money printing. The process of directly borrowing
from the central bank is depicted in Fig. 13. What
we realize is that initially the net money of cus-
tomers and bankers is M and after the Treasury
has borrowed and spent S, the total net money of
customers and bankers is M +S. This increase can
be traced to the central bank as we see that the li-
abilities of the central bank toward the commercial
banks now include the spending of the Treasury.
Everything happens as if the Treasury bonds were
the new gold from which the central bank origi-
nates its liabilities. If we consider the consolidated
state, which would be the Treasury and the central
bank merged, there is certainly an increase of the
net money, or money creation.
FIG. 13 Directly borrowing from the central bank leads to an
increase of the total net money of customers and bankers.
• Borrowing from the banks: In this last case, the
state is forbidden to borrow directly from the cen-
tral bank, and it thus needs to borrow what is
needed from banks. This process goes through es-
sentially the same steps as when an individual bor-
rows from another. The result is that in exchange
of a payment to the Treasury, the state will issue a
bond, that is an IOU toward those who have paid
the Treasury. It can be individuals, but it is not
very common. Commercial bankers perform such
operations, e.g. using their net worth if it is pos-
itive, or simply borrowing from the central bank
what they want to lend to the Treasury. This latter
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method is slightly more complicated as we should
not hide the fact that the commercial bank needs
to provide a collateral, for instance a previously
owned Treasury bond, when borrowing to the cen-
tral bank. The loan thus takes the form of a re-
purchase agreement. At first the commercial bank
sells a bond to the central bank against a smaller
amount of central bank money, and then it buys
it back at its value, the difference between the two
amounts being effectively an interest paid. This is
functionally the same thing as loan, apart that the
collateral is there to make sure the bank will repay
the loan it has contracted in one form or another.
Either it repays by buying back the collateral it
has previously sold, or it defaults and the central
bank keeps the collateral. This collateralized loan
is illustrated in Fig. 14.
FIG. 14 Left: initially the bank already has a Treasury bond
in its assets. Middle: the bank uses it as a collateral to borrow
from the central bank. The maturity of the loan is smaller
and for this to be interesting, the interest rate needs also to
be smaller than the interest served on Treasury bonds. The
repurchase agreement is enclosed in orange dashed lines. In-
stead of holding directly the collateral, the commercial bank
holds a claim on it. Right: after lending to the Treasury, the
commercial bank receives a new Treasury bond. The subse-
quent spending of the Treasury is depicted below in Fig. 15.
2. Net money and financial wealth
When the commercial banks pay the Treasury, they
accept to decrease their net worth, or to increase their li-
abilities toward the central bank, but their net worth will
then receive immediately the bond of the state as a com-
pensation. The amount of IOUs possessed by the bankers
remains constant, but the nature has shifted from cen-
tral bank IOUs which promise nothing, to Treasury IOUs
which promise central bank IOUs in the future with in-
terests. If the bank had to borrow the amount lent to
the Treasury, it must only make sure that the interest
received is larger than the interest paid. Nearly imme-
diately after this, the Treasury spends in the monetary
system the amount of central bank money it has bor-
rowed. This situation is depicted in Figs. 15. This new
Treasury bond held in the banks net worth can then in
turn be used as a collateral for further borrowing at the
central bank, and further lending to the Treasury, with-
out any theoretical limit.
In order to grasp what happens after the Treasury has
spent what it has borrowed, it is useful to contemplate
the special case in which the net worth of the bankers was
initially vanishing. This does not forbid the bankers to
lend to the Treasury, given that what they lend are the
assets they have at the central bank, or provided they
have a suitable collateral they can borrow at most at the
discount rate the central bank money they need. What
we realize in the last graph of Fig. 15 is that the total net
money of customers has increased by the amount spent
by the Treasury. And we can now see a double origin
for this net money. Some comes from the liabilities of
the central bank, and some comes from the liabilities of
the bank sector net worth. But the net worth of the
bank sector remains unchanged since it also receives the
IOUs of the Treasury. What the monetary system has
done is that it has used the net worth of the bankers
to convert the IOUs of the Treasury to IOUs which are
redeemable in central bank money. Finally, we conclude
that when the Treasury borrows directly from the central
bank, the Treasury bonds are converted into net money
by the central bank, whereas when the Treasury borrows
from a commercial bank, this conversion is made by the
commercial bank net worth.
In order to visualize more thoroughly the difference
between these two cases, we can consider the consoli-
dated state (the Treasury and the central bank merged).
The total net money of customers has increased by the
amount spent by the state. In the first case the Treasury
IOUs are internal to the consolidated state, whereas by
borrowing to banks, the Treasury bonds now leak out of
the consolidated state sector as they enter the bankers’
net worth. Now the discussion about the creation of
money is a discussion about the net worth of bankers.
Should we look only at the total net money of customers,
ignoring the structure of the bankers’ net worth? If yes,
then we conclude that there has been money creation,
which finds its origin in the bankers’ net worth. Both
the central bank and the commercial banks are responsi-
ble for the total net money of customers. But if we con-
sider that there is no reason to separate the net worth of
the bankers, which are just a special type of customers,
then we need to subtract the amount owed by the net
worth to the bank vertex, and this amount exactly com-
pensates for the increase of assets in the customers sec-
tor. However, we should not forget that there is another
part in the net worth, which is an asset for the bankers,
and which consists in the Treasury bonds. So in this
second interpretation, we would conclude that the total
net money originated by the central bank is the same as
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FIG. 15 Top left: the simplified monetary system with a con-
solidated bank sector and a consolidated customers sector,
where the net money of the customers and the bankers is M .
Top right: the Treasury borrows an amount S to the banks.
Bottom: the state then spends what it has borrowed. Left
and right are two equivalent representations of the final re-
sult. If the initial net worth of the bankers is initially m = 0,
we realize that now the net money of the customers is M +S
instead of M initially. If we consider both the customers and
the net worth of the banks sector, the net money made of
IOUs which are convertible in central bank money has not
increased, but the financial wealth has increased as the net
worth of banks is also made of Treasury bonds.
initially - it is a reflection of the central bank liabilities
which are unchanged - but the system has been supple-
mented by Treasury bonds which have a financial value
as well. With this interpretation, one would say that no
net money has been created, but the financial wealth has
increased. In Fig. 16 we illustrate with graphs the pro-
cess of Treasury borrowing from banks and spending in
the private sector, but also the possible interpretations
which can be made, depending on the consolidations cho-
sen. We see on this example, that the choice of the con-
solidation used to read a given financial arrangement is
often a reflection of our underlying ideology, as it leads
to draw apparently contradictory conclusions. But the
graph representation helps in formulating unambiguous
statements, as it helps to clarify what is exactly meant
by the word money.
FIG. 16 Several possible consolidations schemes lead to dif-
ferent interpretations. Left: if we look at customers but also
the net worth of bankers, there is no net creation of money
induced by the public debt, but the financial wealth has in-
creased as the net worth of bankers is made of Treasury bonds.
Right: if we look only at the customers, there is net money
creation induced by the new public debt.
3. Discussion
We would live in much more democratic states if the
Treasuries were allowed to borrow directly from their cen-
tral bank, given that state institutions would then have
to be ruled by the governments. By electing a govern-
ment on a program, we would know what spending out
of taxing it is ready to make and thus how much it will
be willing to print, which in the long run is a debate
about the possible level of inflation. But recently, the
idea that democracy should stop at the entrance of the
central bank has won, as it has been argued that deci-
sions made on democratic grounds might be unstable as
they are affected by elections. By not allowing the cen-
tral bank to be under democratic control in the interest
of everybody, and by asking it to be independent, then it
is just serving the interest of a few, namely the commer-
cial bankers as we will argue in the next section. So the
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debate about inflation has been removed from elections,
and central banks have been made independent with a
target on low inflation, so as to guarantee the value of
the assets held by savers.
B. Open market operations
In practice however, as part of the monetary policy,
the central bank buys and sells bonds in open market
operations. At least it is always doing so with short term
Treasury bonds as part of the conventional monetary pol-
icy, and it might decide sometimes to do it as well with
longer maturity Treasury bonds as part of the unconven-
tional monetary policy. Let us ignore in this section the
long term bonds emitted by the Treasury. Due to the
conventional monetary policy, the lined is blurred be-
tween a model where the central bank directly finances
the Treasury, and a model where this is done by commer-
cial banks. When the central bank buys a bond possessed
by a banker, the final result is the same as if the bond
had initially been emitted toward the central bank. That
is in the initial situation, the Treasury owes central bank
money to a commercial bank, and in the final situation,
it owes central bank money to the central bank itself,
and the central bank owes its own IOUs (central bank
money) to the commercial bank.
So the commercial bank has accepted to get rid of an
IOU which bears interest, that is which promises to be
worth more in the future, in exchange of a central bank
IOU which bears no interest. But the Treasury will never
default on its debt, because the state also runs the cen-
tral bank and thus the central bank can buy an infinite
amount of Treasury bonds if it is asked to. Said differ-
ently, if the interest rates for short term Treasury bonds
start to increase as the commercial banks become more
and more reluctant to buy these, the central bank needs
to buy as many short term bonds as necessary to ensure
the short term interest rates on Treasury bonds remain
at the targeted level. In fact, using these open market
operation a sovereign state running a sovereign currency
has the means to ensure that the banks are always willing
to buy Treasury bonds. When Japan entered deflation
in 1990, its public debt kept increasing, without causing
any problem to the monetary structure. Indeed it has
reached and overtaken 200% of GDP, but since all of this
debt is in the national currency, it did not raise any prob-
lem. The only problem it could have generated at some
point was that it could have fostered inflation, but that
is precisely what Japan needed and wanted to achieve.
As we argue now, this system is intrinsically flawed.
First when the commercial bank bought the Treasury
bond, it had to pretend that it was worried the state
might never reimburse, so as to ask for interests rates
which are at least slightly higher than the interest rate at
which they can borrow from the central bank, and make
a profit on the difference. Of course the banks knew they
would always be reimbursed, because the central bank
always stands ready to buy bonds. As the interest rates
departed from the target chosen by the central bank, the
latter bought short term bonds to prevent the short term
rate from increasing. Indeed, in order to convince a com-
mercial bank to get rid of a financial instrument which
is not risky and which bears interest, the only solution is
to pay more than the current value of the bond, which
amounts to a decrease of the interest rate on those bonds.
The bank thus makes an immediate profit instead of a
larger profit later. Indeed this difference goes directly
into the net worth of the banker and amounts to money
creation.
To conclude, we reach the same stage as if the Treasury
had sold directly its bond to the central bank, except that
now we have increased by a small amount the net worth
of the bankers. By first selling the bonds to the commer-
cial banks, instead of selling directly to the central bank,
the bankers were able to realize a small profit. But this
profit is an immediate and easy one. So they have on one
side to pretend they do not like when the Treasury goes
into debt, so as to be able to ask for the highest possible
interest rate, and secretly enjoy it since either they make
a profit when it falls due, or even better immediately if
the central bank buys the bonds to control the interest
rates. This shift between directly financing the Treasury,
and financing through the banks dates back in France to
1973 and it has been continued thanks to the subsequent
European treaties. Given that the commercial bank sec-
tor has a direct interest in it, commercial bankers never
ask for changing this system. Instead they have to play
a game which consists in claiming they do not like public
debt, so as to be able to make simple profits out of their
unnecessary intermediation. In sovereign states, where
the central bank obeys the logic of the government, the
deficits can be huge and still the interest rates paid on
short term bonds are indirectly controlled by the central
bank as it buys a huge amount of what is issued toward
commercial banks. Actually, the central bank must buy
whatever is necessary to control the interest rates of the
short term bonds, as part of the monetary policy.
The commercial banks will always end up with a
part of their assets denominated directly in central bank
money, which bears no interest, and Treasury bonds,
which bear interest. If we adopt a consolidated state
point of view, where we merge the Treasury and the cen-
tral bank, then the commercial banks have two types of
accounts. Deposits which bear no interests, and saving
accounts which generate interests, just like everybody. In
order to control the interest rate, the central bank shifts
the amounts from the interest-less to the interest-bearing
account and vice-versa.
C. State consolidation and sovereign currencies
This point of view of consolidating the Treasury and
the central bank is rather natural for the neo-chartalists.
However it goes against the habits of most economists,
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FIG. 17 Left: the commercial banks have bought the Trea-
sury bonds. Right: they have accepted to sell to the central
bank.
since they are reluctant to consider that the central bank
is a creature of the state, even though it must react au-
tomatically whenever a new public debt is issued. Here
we must be sure to know whether we talk about what
it is, what it could be or what it should be. To us, it
seems reasonable to consider that the Treasury and the
central bank should be consolidated in sovereign states.
Or to state the obvious, we should be able to consolidate
the two, in situations where this is possible, that is in
states where the central bank does everything to control
the short term interest rates of bonds by buying bonds
in open market operations, and acts coherently with the
government. Indeed, we must recall that there are two
types of short term interest rates that the central bank
can control
1. the interbank rate (called the Fed funds rate in the
US), which is the rate at which the banks can bor-
row with collaterals at the central bank. This is
depicted in the middle of Fig. 14. It is necessarily
capped by the discount rate which is the maximum
rate at which they can borrow, and above the rate
paid on commercial bank deposits, if it exists;
2. the short term bonds rate which is affected by open
market operations.
If a bank decides to control the short term bonds rate,
then when conducting outright purchases of short term
Treasury bonds, it will also increase the central bank
liabilities (central bank money), which will decrease the
interbank rate, that is the rate at which the banks can
borrow. Furthermore, the interbank rate is capped by
the discount rate. So controlling the short term bonds
rate implies to control also the interbank rate.
However, a central bank can decide to control only the
interbank rate and not the rate on short term bonds.
For this, it will only conduct repurchase operations, or
collateralized loans to commercial banks. This would af-
fect the rate at which the commercial banks can borrow,
but in general it will not affect directly the rate of the
short term Treasury bonds. Indeed, the Treasury would
then borrow like any customer, and banks are free to
set the conditions. Nearly all developed countries, ex-
cept the Eurozone, control both rates and run what we
call sovereign currencies. Indeed, the European Central
Bank (ECB) has virtually amputated its right arm vol-
untarily, by abandoning the possibility of controlling in-
terest rates on Treasury bonds. This is why the ECB
performs only repurchase agreements to control the in-
terbank rate, but does not control the short term rate
on bonds via outright purchases of Treasury bonds, con-
trary to the Fed monetary policy. Indeed, as there are
several types of bonds, each one of them issued by a dif-
ferent government, the ECB cannot decide which one to
buy as it would amount to a form of financial solidar-
ity between the various European states, and this is in-
tentionally avoided in the European Union construction.
As the various Treasuries are not helped by the ECB to
issue low interest bonds, everything happens as if they
were borrowing in a foreign currency, where the interest
rates are set by the bankers, just like for any standard
customer. Indeed, the bankers lending to the Eurozone
Treasuries decide what should be the markup rate, that
is the difference between the rate at which they borrow,
which is effectively the interbank rate set by the central
bank, and the rate at which the lend to the various Trea-
suries. On the contrary, the United Kingdom (UK) or
the USA are in the configuration where the central bank
buys whatever is necessary to control the interest rate on
bonds, and things are as if the Treasury was borrowing
from the central bank, except for the small profit made
by bankers due to their intermediation.
To conclude, if the Treasury borrows directly from the
central bank, it makes sense to consolidate the Treasury
and the central bank. If it borrows from commercial
banks, but the central bank controls the short term in-
terest rates on the bonds, the effective theory is nearly
the same, and it still makes sense to consolidate the Trea-
sury and the central bank. We must also mention that
so far we have considered only short term bonds. First,
the Treasury could perfectly issue short term bonds only.
That would certainly work fine if the Treasury was bor-
rowing directly from the central bank. And if the Trea-
sury needs to borrow to commercial banks, it would be
sure to pay the standard rate as the central bank needs to
control the interest rate on short term bonds and must
be prepared to buy whatever is needed to achieve this
goal. But it is a reality that Treasuries also issue longer
term bonds. Since the commercial bankers need to pro-
tect themselves from the risk of higher short term interest
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rates, which is the rate at which they borrow, there is nec-
essarily a markup rate and long term bonds always have a
higher interest rate. But this might precisely be what the
government could try to achieve. Indeed the long term
bonds are not repaid at once at the end of their maturity,
but instead the interests are paid in coupons gradually,
with the principal repaid only at the end. So by buying
these, the banks have a way to predict and control a sub-
stantial part of their future cash flows. Issuing bonds of
various maturities is thus a way to stabilize the banking
sector and to smooth the issuing of bonds.
However, if like in the Eurozone the central bank stops
controlling the interest rate on bonds but controls only
the interbank rate, the Treasury is treated like a standard
customer, that is it is treated by the central bank as if it
was a foreign Treasury. We say that this is not a sovereign
currency. Note that in that case, the governments might
find it more convenient to issue only long termTreasury
bonds, so as to postpone the repayment after the next
general election. The consolidation might still be possible
formally, since any consolidation can be made as it is just
an accounting simplification, but it hides some salient
features. Sometimes the commercial banks would add
only a small markup rate to the Treasury bonds and one
would not see the difference, but in case of crisis the
markup rates can start to be huge, on all maturities,
even reaching the point where the commercial banks stop
buying Treasury bonds like in the recent Eurozone debt
crisis.
D. Should it stay or Schuld it go: the clash
We have seen that when the Treasury borrows and
spends, it increases the financial wealth of customers and
bankers. But it is subject to interpretation in order to
decide if it increases the net money or not. It depends
how we consider the net worth of bankers. There is thus
a huge debate on the nature of money and the nature
of debt. Essentially, apart from the fact that Treasury
bonds bear an interest, they have an intrinsic difference
with central bank IOUs, which is that they have a matu-
rity, and are thus bound to disappear through the reim-
bursement of the Treasury’s debt. But we have seen that
for the customers, the monetary system has resulted in
an apparent conversion of the Treasury’s IOUs into nor-
mal bank deposits for customers. Let us take a simple
case where 20% of the net deposits is a reflection of the
central bank IOUs, and the rest comes from government
debt. The good news is that since this mixing between
the different origins has been made possible thanks to
the banking system, it means that by construction the
customers have always more assets than the debt of the
state. So the state could always, at least in theory, run
a huge temporary tax on capitals which would reduce
the assets of customers and increase the Treasury ac-
count. For an order of magnitude this would be one year
of GDP since nowadays public debts are of that order.
With this it would then be able to reimburse the pending
bonds. See Fig. 18 for an illustration. As a result, the net
money would be reduced by that amount. But if initially
around 80% of the customers net financial wealth was the
reflection of public debt, then it means that the financial
wealth on deposit and saving accounts has been reduced
by the same amount. If we imagine that people will feel
poorer they will stop consuming and this will cast the
economy into an extreme recession initiated by a defla-
tion. But the Treasury could be proud of having elimi-
nated all of its debt. Since 2011, this is what has been
done in countries, mainly European countries because of
Germany, where it has been decided to reduce the public
debt. And that is where macroeconomics starts to be a
social science. People could be fine with the reduction
of their financial wealth, being prepared that in the long
run prices should decrease, or even changing their saving
habits so that it does not happen. There is in principle
nothing wrong and one could imagine that some countries
might cope with it in happiness. But we think that it is
more likely that the private sector sticks at least partially
to its previous saving habits, meaning that everybody
tries to spend less, causing deflation and possibly after
recession. So by ignoring this, the goal of debt reduc-
tion can be extremely harmful to the economy. Actually
whenever a state runs a surplus, this never lasts more
than a few years (Wray, 1990, 2004), and then recession
enters the game to generate new deficits. If public debts
have been reduced when compared to the GDP during
some period of history, they are nearly always constantly
increasing in nominal value, because the total net money
of customers needs to go more or less at the same pace
as GDP growth plus inflation to satisfy the habits.
However, all our preconceived ideas run counter proper
thinking. For instance, in Germany money is named
Geld, and it is a derivative of Gold. It thus carries a
meaning which goes beyond the real nature of money
where convertibility has been abandoned. On the con-
trary, debt is called Schuld, but this is the same word
which is used for guilt or fault6, depending on how we
translate. So the denomination hampers a proper think-
ing, since as the Germans pronounce the word debt, they
immediately mean what they should do about it, that
is getting rid of it, as it is morally bad. By drawing
the consolidated graph structure, we are able to remove
the words which convey too much ideology, as only as-
set/liabilities relations of different types appear.
E. A horizon definition of money
In the end, the debate is about what we think the debt
will become in the very long run. Indeed, in a system
6 As noticed and analyzed in Graeber (2011), this is also the case
in many ancient languages (Sanskrit, Hebrew, Aramaic).
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FIG. 18 Left: the state levies a huge tax. Middle: the tax is
effectively paid to the Treasury. Right: The state settles its
debts and gets clear of all debts.
which has abandoned convertibility, central bank money
is an eternal debt. The central bank owes gold, but it
owes it in an infinite time because it has stopped the
convertibility of its IOUs into commodities. It would
thus be tempting to define money as a debt which is never
reimbursed. Interestless money in that definition would
thus be just one type of money. A concrete example to
apply such definition is to consider the paper debts which
have been issued by the US federal government during the
civil war. At that time, paper notes were issued having
the status of a debt, in order to finance the war. But they
kept being exchanged and were subsequently considered
as currency, without being redeemed into gold, but being
used to pay taxes.
The problem with such definition of money is that it
is not local in time. Indeed, we need to know the full
future of the debt to deduce if it was actually money
or if it really was a debt which has been reimbursed7.
The drawback of the definition is thus that we do not
know what will be the infinite future, since this is fun-
damentally impossible. So we have to rely on a lighter
and imperfect definition, where we would consider that
a debt is money if there is a consensus among customers
that it will never be reimbursed (or reimbursed by issuing
an equivalent debt). This deeply depends on the point of
view. For any debt issued by the Treasury, there are thus
always two extreme point of views. For the ones who be-
lieve that since states always run deficits, it is for sure
a type of money. We call this point of view the should
point of view since in this point of view we should run
deficits, at least in pace with growth and expected infla-
7 This construction is thus similar to the definition of horizons in
General Relativity, where the definition relies on the full future
of the spacetime solution.
tion. Conversely, for those who think that debts should
and will be reimbursed, no matter the state of the future
economy, the public debt cannot be considered as money.
We can call this point of view the Schuld point of view.
The debate between should and Schuld is reminiscent of
the debate about rational expectations. If the state is-
sues a new debt, does it mean that there is an actual debt
of the customers toward the state? Those who think that
this debt exists no matter what are in the Schuld sector,
whereas those who ignore such possibility, by arguing
that people do not look at national accounting for the
personal wealth, are in the should. The Schuld point of
view was first formulated formally as the Ricardo-Barro
equivalence, according to which taxpayers exactly antic-
ipate future taxes from current deficits. The two point
of views are summarized in Fig. 19. If the Ricardo-Barro
equivalence is invoked, the financial wealth of customers
and bankers always remains unchanged, even when the
Treasury borrows, and remains M , that is the total lia-
bilities of the central bank, whereas if the equivalence is
ignored (as we think it should be), the financial wealth
is increased by public deficits and is thus M + S, where
S is the total debt.
We must say it is hard to be convinced by the argu-
ment that people will take decisions thinking about a
possible debt they owe to the Treasury. We think that
in order to find a convincing answer in this debate we
must look at the past behaviour of major western states.
And what we find is that, apart for a few years, they run
constant deficits and the sovereign debts keep growing in
nominal values. Only on some occasions, some govern-
ments manage to run a surplus but this never lasts very
long. For the US history, this is certainly the case, where
there was just occasional years of surplus in an ocean of
deficits (Wray, 2004). Even Germany, which is patroniz-
ing the rest of Europe, was in deficit up to 2015. So the
conclusion when we look at history, is that deficits are
typical rather than unusual as they allow for an increase
of the financial wealth of customers which goes along
GDP growth and inflation. But again economics is a so-
cial science. Nothing prevents a given society at a give
time to suddenly feel the need to enforce the Ricardo-
barro equivalence.
F. Monetary policy
In the next section, we present the essential features
of the current conventional monetary policies, and then
treat afterwards the main differences brought by the un-
conventional monetary policies
1. Conventional monetary policy
The instruments of the monetary policy are very com-
plex and can be very different from one country to an-
other. It is by no means the goal of this paper to present
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FIG. 19 Left: the point of view that when the state issues
a debt the customer do not feel the need to reimburse it.
Right: For any new debt, the customers anticipate that they
have a debt toward the state, with the same value, interest
and maturity. This is the Ricardo-Barro equivalence. On
both graphs we circle the consolidated sector of customers and
bankers. In the right graph, the Ricardo-Barro equivalence
reduces the total financial wealth. Actually, in this point of
view, no matter the debt of the state, the financial wealth can
only remain constant.
them all. The main conventional tools are the control of
short term interest rates, and the reserves requirements.
• Conventional monetary policy is about controlling
the short term interest rates. We have already seen
in § III.C that in its simplest implementation, the
central bank performs outright purchases of short
term Treasury bonds so as to control the interest
rates on the short term public debt. Nobody is
forced to sell, but in practice, if the central banks
buys at a higher price than the face value of the
bond, it would always be able to convince a bank
to sell its bond. By doing this, it controls indirectly
the interbank rate, which is anyway constrained to
be larger than the rate paid on deposits, if any,
and smaller than the discount window rate. In-
deed, when a Treasury bond is bought by the cen-
tral bank, the commercial bank which has sold the
bond is left with central bank money which bears
no interest. It can earn the interest rate on de-
posits, but might also try to earn more by lending
to other banks this excess of central bank money.
Other banks might be interested only if these inter-
bank loans are made at a rate lower than the dis-
count rate, since this is the rate at which they can
always borrow. So the central bank needs only to
fine tune the rate between the rate on deposits and
the discount rate, to reach its target on interbank
rates. Let us stress again that in the Eurozone, the
ECB does not control the interest rate on Trea-
sury bonds but only the interbank rate through re-
purchase agreements. It thus implements a weaker
monetary policy, and states are treated as cus-
tomers, that is they are treated as huge but in-
dependent companies.
We must insist that controlling the interbank rate is
not sufficient to control the rate at which customers
borrow. Indeed, when commercial banks lend, they
need to apply at least the interbank rate as it is the
rate at which they need to borrow when the loan
is used to pay outside of the commercial bank, or
when a part of the amount loaned is transformed
into cash, that is into central bank money. But
they also need to apply a markup rate to this ba-
sic interbank rate at which they borrow for several
reasons. First, the borrowers might default and the
bank needs to make sure that it generates enough
profits from non defaulting loans to compensate for
the defaulting ones8. Second the commercial banks
need to make a profit to cover their running costs
as they need to pay at least the salaries of their
employees. Finally, since they have borrowed on a
short term basis, but they lend on a longer term
basis, they need to have a security margin in case
the central bank increases the interbank rate. For
all these reasons, the effective rate at which the
economy is functioning, is different from the basic
interbank rate chosen by the central bank. If the
central bank wants to foster credit with low inter-
est rates, it is as important to set a low interbank
rate as to communicate about the fact that this
interest rate shall remain low, so as to decrease as
much as possible the markup rate. Finally, we must
stress that the interest rate is not the only criteria
to ask for a credit, as decisions are made on much
more fundamental economic grounds. Even if the
markup rate remains constant, the interest rate set
by the central bank is only an indirect tool to con-
trol credit and thus the total money.
• The second most common monetary tool is made
of the reserve requirements for commercial banks.
In the theory of the money multiplier, the central
money held by banks should be a fraction of its
liabilities toward its customers, and this fraction
should be set by the monetary authorities. It is
then assumed that by controlling the amount of
central bank money held by the banks, and by fix-
ing the ratio, the central bank could control the to-
tal credit, and thus the total money. But this tool
cannot be efficient, because the amount of central
8 When the loan is an investment loan, such as when customers buy
houses, the investment in real assets is also used as a guarantee.
If the borrower fails to repay the loan, the property of the real
asset, e.g. the house, is transfered to the bank.
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bank money held by banks is not exogenously set.
Indeed what is counted as a reserve for a commer-
cial bank is not its net central money, but its central
money. So if the bank does not have enough central
money reserves, for instance because it has granted
too many loans, it can borrow the reserves needed
at most at the discount rate, and more probably
at the interbank rate. When the bank does so, at
the same time it receives central bank money and
increases its reserves to comply with its legal obli-
gation, but it owes it as well at a later date, and this
does not count negatively in the reserves. We see
that the difference between net central bank money
and central bank money is very important. The
central bank can control its net liabilities toward
the banks, e.g. by performing outright purchases
of Treasury bonds, but it cannot control its liabil-
ities, as these are endogenously determined by the
needs of the commercial banks. In practice, banks
lend whenever they think it is profitable for them,
and if they fail to meet their reserve requirements
at the end of the day, they just borrow (directly
to the central bank at most at the discount rate
or to other banks) what is needed. In a few devel-
oped countries (Canada, Australia, UK, Sweden,
Norway) there are no more fractional reserves and
nothing special happens. As long as the required
reserves are not net reserves, they are entirely use-
less. Furthermore, even if the fractional reserve
system was applied to net central money held by
banks, this would only set an upper limit to credit,
but it could not increase automatically the amount
of credit if it is below the cap.
In fact the net assets of the banks, that is their net
worth which includes the capital which has been
given in by the stockholder, is instead extremely
important. These are true reserves which are going
to be used whenever a bank suffers losses. It is thus
no wonder that after the 2008 financial crisis, the
rules for the fractional reserves have not been mod-
ified, whereas the capital requirements have been
radically increased in the third Basel Accord.
G. Unconventional Monetary Policy
Unconventional monetary policy does not really dif-
fer from the conventional one in its nature, but it differs
in scale and maturity. In conventional monetary policy,
the central bank controls only the short term interest
rates. In unconventional monetary policies, the central
bank starts to control also the long term interest rates.
As for the short term interest rates, there are two rates
that need to be controlled. The rates on bonds, and the
interbank rates. So the unconventional monetary poli-
cies consists in huge amount of loans to bank with long
maturities [like in the Long-Term Refinancing Operations
(LTRO)], and huge outright purchases of long term Trea-
sury bonds (see Fig. 20 for illustrations).
• For huge amounts of loans, there is absolutely no
change to the net worth of banks, because as we
should remind, for any amount of central money
created in a loan, there is a corresponding debt
which is also created. So the net effect is rather in-
significant. It is only used to ensure that the banks
which have suffered heavy losses can meet their re-
serve requirement without having to borrow at the
discount rate which is noticeably too high. And
also by making these loans long term (a few years)
rather than short term (a few days or weeks), it
is symbolically a guarantee that interest rates will
remain low, and it is hoped that it will contribute
to reduce the markup rate for the loans granted by
commercial banks. This tool was mainly used by
the ECB at the onset of the Eurozone debt crisis,
as it could not perform outright purchases of Trea-
sury bonds. The hope was that with this excess of
central bank money, the commercial banks would
lend to Eurozone Treasuries with more favorable
conditions.
• Quantitative easing (QE) is a massive outright pur-
chase of assets, among which long term Treasury
bonds. If the bonds which are bought by the cen-
tral bank to the commercial banks are corporate
bonds, it removes the risk by transferring it to the
central bank. The commercial bank gets rid of a
non-liquid and risky asset which bears interest, for
an absolutely non-risky asset which bears no inter-
est, that is central bank money. If the bonds are
long term Treasury bonds, then it is part of the
interest rate management of the public debt. By
its scale, this outright purchase of Treasury bonds
ensures that the central bank would need to give a
good price for the banks to accept getting rid of oth-
erwise non risky assets. The difference between the
face value of a Treasury bond, and the price paid
by the central bank goes directly in the bankers net
worth. Now the only difference is the scale. If this
is made on massive heaps of Treasury bonds, the
increase of the bankers net worth might be sizable.
It is equivalent to spend directly into the net worth
of bankers. It is a form a public spending, but in-
stead of spending for the benefit of all, the central
bank creates IOUs for the sole benefit of bankers.
The longer the central bank waits to buy bonds,
and the best profit the bankers make. This is what
has happened inside the EU in 2015. A major part
of long term Treasury bonds, on which the bankers
have asked already large interest rates for inexist-
ing risks, will be bought by the ECB, ensuring an
easy profit for bankers.
To conclude, the outright purchase of Treasury
bonds in a QE has only a very small effect as it re-
places debts of one kind (Treasury bonds) by debts
of another kind (central money). Its main effect is
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to lower the rates on long term bonds. But Trea-
suries do not need to issue long term bonds, as
they can always decide to issue only short term
bonds, for which the rate is automatically con-
trolled through the conventional monetary policy.
The excess of central bank money generated by the
QE in the balance sheets of commercial banks has
no reason to expand the credits made to the pri-
vate sector, and this is another way to understand
that the theory of the money multiplier is flawed.
This is why nothing happens in the real economy.
However in the process, there is a sizable money
creation in the bankers net worth. The hope is
then that bankers will spend this amount of money
and foster the growth of the GDP.
In a further step, they might think that they have
too much central money and not enough corporate
bonds compared to their habits. If this is the case,
they will trade in buying corporate bonds, that is
they will exchange central money and corporate
bonds in opposite directions, up to the point where
higher prices for corporate bonds will satisfy their
portfolio allocation. If this is the case, the QE is
just creating a bubble on financial markets by in-
creasing the price of corporate bonds.
FIG. 20 Left: a LTRO increased the deposits of the com-
mercial banks at the central bank, but it also increases their
debts. The net worth of the banker is unchanged. Right: In
an outright purchase of bonds (e.g. a QE), the central bank
had to pay an extra amount to the bankers so as to convince
them to sell. Even if tiny, this amounts to money creation
which might be spent if bankers decide to spend it. Or it
can be kept in the commercial bank sector and lead to higher
prices for all other financial assets like corporate bonds. This
depends on portfolio preferences of the commercial banks.
IV. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
So far, we have idealized as much as possible the mon-
etary system for the sake of simplicity and clarity. There
is nothing which prevents in exposing the same situation
using graphs in many more details. But for the purpose of
answering simple and fundamental questions such as what
is money and when is money created?, what is the effect
of public debt?, is a QE equivalent to money printing?,
there is no need for many details, and on the contrary
consolidated graphs are a major tool. As we have em-
phasized, the main advantage of a representation using
graphs is that it helps understanding the various posi-
tions about the interpretation of the monetary system.
Can we consolidate the Treasury and the central bank?
Is there a Riccardo-Barro equivalence for new public debt
emission? As we have already answered, the different
possible answers to these questions are just about in-
terpretation of graphs, that is about words that we can
drape around possible situations.
However, there is so far a major simplification which
we cannot overlook anymore. There are inevitably sev-
eral sovereign states, each with its own currency, that
is its own central bank and its own Treasury, using its
own unit of account. A complete model of our monetary
system must thus be a model of several monetary sys-
tems, together with their interactions. It is now time to
consider the possibility of foreign currencies interacting
with a national currency. There are several presentations
which could be made to present the various possible in-
ternational arrangements. For simplicity, we choose a
rather historical presentation, in which we first focus on
fixed exchange rates system which were more common in
the past, and present only thereafter floating exchange
rates which are now the international standard. We fi-
nally discuss the notion of debt in international monetary
systems. In order to emphasize that we have now sev-
eral states, we will talk about citizens rather than bank
customers throughout.
A. Fixed exchange rate system
Whenever a national citizen, is paid by a foreign citizen
in a foreign currency, he might prefer an asset denomi-
nated in his national currency rather than an asset in a
foreign denominated unit of account. As usual, there is
no universal law behind this, and all possible choices are
in principle possible. He might find it perfectly fine and
preferable to hold foreign currencies. However, we must
remind that taxpayers need to pay their taxes in the na-
tional currency, so in principle this should trigger at least
a small preference for the national currency depending on
the state of the commercial balance9.
9 If the amount of foreign currencies paid to national citizens is the
reflection of a current account surplus, there is no special need
27
In the case where the citizen indeed wants to get rid
of a foreign asset, he will ask his bank to exchange it
for a national asset. In a fixed rate exchange system, the
amount which should be traded is obvious. The commer-
cial bank will take the foreign currency for itself (for its
net worth), and will create a deposit denominated in the
national unit of account, that is it will create a deposit
for the citizen who got rid of foreign currencies. The
process might then be repeated between the commercial
bank and the central bank. The commercial bank might
prefer to hold a liability of its national central bank than
a liability of a foreign central bank. In that case, the
central bank will take the foreign central bank money
as an asset and will increase the national central bank
money deposit of the commercial bank. These steps are
illustrated in Fig. 21.
FIG. 21 Top left: a national citizen is paid with foreign cur-
rency. Top right: he asks to its commercial bank to transform
this foreign asset into a national currency asset. Bottom.
left: the national central bank prefers to hold the foreign cen-
tral bank IOUs than foreign commercial bank IOUs. Bottom
right: the national bank asks its central bank to convert its
asset denominated in a foreign currency to an asset in the
national currency.
As a final result, it is the national central bank which
directly possesses the liability of the foreign central bank,
that is which has a deposit at the foreign central bank.
The resulting situation is extremely similar to what
would have happened if the national citizen had been
paid in gold in a regime of convertibility, and if at ev-
ery stage the gold had been passed to the higher level
for national currencies in order to pay national taxes.
(from the citizen to its commercial bank and then to the
central bank). The resulting situation is indeed that the
total net money of the national sector has been increased
by rP , where P is the initial foreign payment, and r is
the rate of conversion to the national unit of account. It
is because of this analogy that commodities and foreign
currencies held by central bank are treated essentially on
the same footing. In a regime of fixed exchange rate,
foreign currencies are treated like gold in a regime of
convertibility. If payments are made in gold or in foreign
currencies, they can be passed over to the central bank
which creates the corresponding net money. Conversely
when gold or foreign currencies are asked, the central
banks reverts the situation and detaches the asset from
its balance sheet, but in the process it also reduces its
liabilities in central bank money, effectively reducing the
net national money.
In a regime of convertibility between money and gold,
we have already seen that the system cannot hold since
all the liabilities of the commercial banks are guaranteed
to be converted into gold, and whenever there has been
debt issuing, this is more than the total amount of central
bank money reflected into the deposits of the commercial
banks at the central bank. To illustrate it simply, it is
sufficient to borrow money at any given commercial bank,
and then ask the corresponding deposit to be converted
to gold. At some point this cannot be done because gold
is only the reflection of the net money of the monetary
system and not the total money, part of it was created as
a counterpart of debts. Given the analogy between gold
and foreign currencies in a fixed exchanged rate system,
the same argument applies to foreign currencies. It is
always possible to break down the fixed exchange rate
by asking the conversion of national currency into foreign
currency, and given that there is more money than net
money, there is always a way to reach the point at which
the central bank reserves are depleted.
Even though what we state here is obvious, we should
remember that after having believed the world could
work with both gold convertibility and a lending bank-
ing sector, it was then widely believed (e.g. in the 80s
and 90s) that fixed exchange rates (a currency peg) for
developing countries would be the right system. It is not
the purpose of this paper to try to understand why this
happened to be the case, even though a simple thought
experiment is enough to understand it can obviously not
work. As an example, the currency pegs lead to the Asian
crisis in 1997.
In fact any national central bank can compute two lim-
iting exchange rates.
• An incoming exchange rate. If the total assets in
foreign central money is MF, and the total amount
of national central money created in counterpart
was MN, then we can define an entering rate as
ri ≡ MN
MF
. (3)
For instance if the eurodollars are the euro created
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by the ECB when accepting Fed central money, the
ratio of the eurodollars created to the dollar re-
ceived is the entering exchange rate between euros
and dollars.
• An outgoing exchange rate. It is the ratio between
the total money Mtot (and not just the net money
Mnet) to the foreign currencies held
ro ≡ Mtot
MF
⇒ ro ≡ riMtot
MN
. (4)
This exchange rate is the only one which the cen-
tral bank is sure to be able to guarantee, since by
construction there will always be enough reserves.
By construction, we also realize that ro > ri. A cen-
tral bank trying to defend a constant exchange rate will
always try to defend the incoming rate, whereas it can
only defend the outgoing exchange rate which is much
larger10. In other words, a central bank can never de-
fend a fixed exchange rate. As long as it has a banking
sector, the project of defending an exchange rate is born
dead. This does not mean that central banks should not
accept foreign currencies, in time of current account sur-
plus, but just that they do not guarantee the backward
conversion of national currency into foreign currency at
the prevailing incoming exchange rate.
The only possibility for the system to hold would be if
the national central bank had the right to borrow foreign
central money to the foreign central bank. But if this
right was granted, then the situation would be rather
similar to the case of commercial banks having the right
to borrow from a central bank, and this would ensure
that all liabilities can be cleared at par, that is with a
fixed exchange rate. This was exactly the European sit-
uation between 1999 and 2002, when all eurozone cur-
rencies had a fixed exchanged rate with the euro foreign
currency, and all national central banks were granted the
right to borrow from the ECB as much as they needed.
Eventually, as planned earlier in the Maastricht treaty,
all national currencies were abandoned and the system
was further integrated into a single currency, as this was
just a technical intermediary situation. But in general a
foreign central bank has no particular interest in granting
the right to borrow from the national central bank.
We realize again that granting the right to go in debt
is the key of financial power. At every vertex of the
tree structure, granting the right to go in debt to ver-
tices which are lower is a form of power on them. The
household is afraid that its commercial banker might not
grant a loan, and needs to accept the conditions set by
the banker, the commercial bank is told at the higher
level at which rate, under which conditions, for which
10 In the way we defined the exchange rate, a higher exchange rate
means a weaker national currency.
maturity, it can borrow central bank money. And if the
national central bank now wants to borrow a foreign cur-
rency, it will have to accept the conditions of the foreign
central bank.
If an economy starts to fix its currency at parity with
a foreign currency, its central bank somehow inserts itself
in the tree structure of the foreign country, and instead of
being at the apex of the system, it is now situated below
the foreign central bank and needs to ask for the permis-
sion to go into debt. Even though this type of power of
the foreign central bank onto the national central bank
is formally similar to the power a commercial has on its
customers, it is also extremely different. A central bank
possesses a form of power on the national financial sys-
tem as it sets the condition of debts in commercial banks
and thus below for national customers/citizens. At least
in principle, it is acting for the interest of the national
economy as it is a creature of the state. Instead, when a
foreign central bank grants the right to a national bank
to borrow foreign central bank money, it has absolutely
no reason to act in the interest of the national citizens.
If a weak economy wants to fix its currency to a strong
economy, and does not have a full constitutional right to
borrow in this external currency, as is always the case,
there are essentially two possible situations. Either the
country ensures that it will never need foreign curren-
cies to defend the exchange rate. In order to achieve
this it would need a strong commercial surplus, and even
this might not be enough to make sure that the currency
cannot be hedged given the internal inconsistency of the
system. Or it needs to borrow the foreign currency, e.g.
because of a current account deficit, and needs to comply
with the politics imposed by the foreign country. The al-
ternative is thus either to work for free (this is the essence
of a permanent commercial surplus for which the dom-
inant foreign countries pays simply by public deficits)
or to be told how to work and what to sell (structural
reforms imposed by creditors). In both situations, the
strong foreign country has the means to ensure that the
situation is profitable. Either it can live at a higher stan-
dard than it could, or it decides what it wants to buy and
at which price under the programs of structural reforms.
But this era of fixed exchange rate is now over as the
pegs to the US dollar have damaged too heavily devel-
oping economies. Let us thus examine the case in which
exchange rates are floating as they are not guaranteed by
central banks.
B. Floating exchange rates
Under a regime of floating exchange rate, the process
of passing foreign currencies can still be performed rather
easily, because whenever foreign currencies are accepted
by national citizens, it has to be done with a given ex-
change rate (the one prevailing on the markets at that
time) which can be used to decide which amount of na-
tional central bank money should be created in exchange
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of the foreign currency. The only thing which must not
be guaranteed is the backward conversion. Once a cit-
izen and then its bank has asked to convert a foreign
currency into their national currency, the central bank
does not provide a way to revert this. Or at least does
not guarantee that it will accept doing it in any case.
As a consequence, if national citizens now want to pay
foreign citizens, they will have to use their national cur-
rency and make sure that it gets accepted by foreign cit-
izens, who will in turn pass it on to the central bank
as they might prefer holding liabilities denominated in
the foreign currency (which for them is a national cur-
rency). If this is the case, we reach a situation where a
central bank A has liabilities toward a central bank B,
and conversely the central bank B has liabilities toward
the central bank A. This situation is depicted in Fig. 22.
It is possible to cancel these mutual relationships, only if
the two central banks can agree on an exchange rate.
As a side comment, note that in practice central banks
will not keep their assets denominated in a foreign cen-
tral bank money very long. Indeed, these bear no inter-
est and it is thus preferable to exchange them for foreign
Treasury bonds which bear interest. Both foreign cen-
tral bank money and foreign Treasury bonds are gath-
ered under the term foreign reserves in annual reports
of central banks. In that sense one would say that coun-
tries with recurrent current account surpluses finance the
public deficits of foreign countries. This highlights that if
economists still argue about the possibility of consolidat-
ing the Treasury with the central bank, central bankers,
who peer into foreign systems only from far, always con-
sider that there are two types of foreign assets, those who
bear no interest (central bank money) and those who bear
interest (Treasury bonds), but they equally deserve the
name of foreign reserves. It does not matter for them who
is at the origin of the asset, as long as the assets are reli-
able (the foreign country could e.g. decide sanctions and
unilaterally cancel these assets), they are equally good,
with those bearing interests being even better to be used
as reserves. In fact, as long as the foreign central bank
has a target on interest rates, it will always be willing
to buy its own national Treasury bonds, to avoid an in-
crease in interest rates, ensuring a type of convertibility
from bonds to central bank money.
More realistically, there are several foreign currencies
as there are several foreign sovereign states, and the cen-
tral banks hold assets denominated in many other central
banks unit of account, not just one. We thus have a sit-
uation rather similar to a decentralized system of banks,
where each central banks is at the top of a tree struc-
ture, but the central banks interact through one-to-one
asset/liability relations. The only but substantial dif-
ference that all these assets/liabilities relations between
central banks are denominated in different units of ac-
count. We are back to a monetary system which is not
optimally organized as the network of central banks has
many loops.
The system can even be more complex if the liabilities
FIG. 22 Top: the central bank has taken foreign assets and
converted them onto national liabilities. Bottom: commer-
cial banks have kept foreign assets and have created national
currency liabilities.
held by commercial banks in foreign currencies are not
passed to their central bank. Indeed, a commercial bank
can decide to keep assets denominated in other units of
account, originated from foreign commercial banks. In
that case, we can see that the national money creation
induced by the income of foreign currency is originated
in the net worth of commercial banks and not by their
central bank. This situation is also depicted in Fig. 22.
As the number of commercial banks is much larger than
central banks, all these mutual relations can reach a level
of high complexity, as each bank of each country needs
to have asset/liability relations with all other banks from
the world. The typical number of currencies is 100, when
the typical number of banks within a currency area is
10−100, so this means that this system implies 106−108
bilateral relations.
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Every time the system is too complex, it will self or-
ganize into a tree structure which is more efficient. This
is essentially done in two manners.
• First, small commercial banks will interact only
with one major commercial bank of a given cur-
rency area. This means that in a given currency
area, there are major commercial banks, who or-
ganize small foreign commercial banks into a tree
structure below them, so that we have effectively
a system with four levels (central banks, major
commercial banks, smaller commercial banks, and
customers/citizens), and with a reduced number of
loops.
• Second, international trade will be made in only
a small number of strong currencies. In practice,
this means that commercial banks will only accept
assets denominated in foreign currencies, if this for-
eign currency corresponds to a strong enough eco-
nomic area. This led the current international sys-
tem to be based on the dollar, the euro, the yen
and the pound.
We already see the problem that weak economies will
encounter. It is not easy either for a weak economy to
work under a floating exchange rate, since it might be
hard to get its national currency accepted. Indeed, ev-
eryone can create money, but the most difficult is to get
it accepted. Conversely, the US are extremely good in
making sure that their currency gets accepted. The ca-
pability of a given country to pay in its own currency is
a direct reflection of its international power. As a con-
sequence, any country which runs a commercial surplus
has no interest in accepting payments in foreign curren-
cies. To put it in simple words, the US are able to pay in
dollars either because other countries are naive enough
to accept it, or because the US have enough power on
them to impose it.
All central banks but the Fed do maintain reserves
in foreign currencies, mostly in yens, euros, dollars and
pounds. Indeed, the US have insignificant foreign re-
serves compared to their economic size (Fed, 2012),
mainly in the form of SDR, and they are the only ones
able to do so. They are indeed completely sure, in the
current context, that they can impose a payment in their
own currency. And in that sense, it can be said that they
completely dominate the international monetary system,
as they locate their central bank at the apex, writing
IOUs denominated in dollars to exporting countries from
which they import, rather than borrowing from them in
the foreign currency.
As a political comment, one should note that there
is absolutely nothing fundamental in it. From a neo-
chartalist perspective, one would observe that there is no
international tax denominated in dollars so the power of
imposing the dollar as the ultimate currency is not en-
forced by the ability to tax, but is rather a soft power
of cultural domination inherited from past history. In-
deed current leaders in the world were trained and raised
before the end of Bretton-Woods agreements where only
the US dollar was convertible in gold, and they are thus
inevitably biased in thinking that there is a fundamen-
tal reason for the US dollar to be the dominant currency.
However nothing prevents this to be reverted at any time.
To make it simple, the Chinese government might decide
not to accept anymore Fed or US Treasury IOUs in pay-
ment of the US/China commercial deficit, but rather ask
that the payment be made through loans denominated
in yuans. Should several major developing and export-
ing countries ask this at the same time, then there would
be a currency crisis hitting the US, as the terms of inter-
national trade would be strongly shifted.
In practice, even if it is true that there is no interna-
tional tax denominated in dollars which would be suffi-
cient to enforce the domination of the dollar in the inter-
national monetary system, it should be noted that com-
modities, and most importantly oil, are traded and paid
for in dollars. This fact, which again is only based on
habits and history but on nothing fundamental, acts ef-
fectively as if there was an international tax in dollar
on all net importing countries, and even if this tax is
not benefiting the US Treasury but rather the exporting
countries, it seems that it is enough to maintain this sys-
tem in which the dollar dominates. Given that the US
are net importers of commodities (oil is also imported
in the US as shale oil is not enough for US consump-
tion), there is no reason why this should remain the case
in the future. At some point exporting countries of key
commodities might ask to be paid either in their own
currency, which in practice means that they would con-
trol the terms of the debt contracted by importers, or at
least in other currencies than the dollar. It is of course
impossible to predict when this situation will end, since
it will always be possible that exporting countries prefer
to be paid in dollars, even though they do not have to,
and even though by doing this they do not act in their
best interest as it ensures they remain dominated by the
US.
C. International loans and the IMF
We have seen that the key to international financial
power is to control the right of others to borrow in
one’s currency. Even though the US have an effective
supremacy, they would certainly lose it immediately if
they were imposing strong conditions to borrowers. In-
deed, there are several major currencies which could then
step in and grant the right to borrow under milder con-
ditions. And as they are major currencies they would be
as good to finance commercial deficits of importing coun-
tries. To make it simple, if a developing country cannot
borrow in dollar to pay for its oil imports, it could do so
in euros or pounds, and it would probably be accepted
by oil exporters. Indeed it is not because oil prices are
set in dollars that they are always paid for in dollars.
It is thus essential for creditors who want to use their
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power of granting loans to control the economies of bor-
rowers to act collectively, so as to avoid unnecessary com-
petition. If the US dollar cannot maintain itself at the
apex of the system, it must at least share this better po-
sition with a few other strong currencies. The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) is currently implementing
that logic at the international level. On the good side,
it creates an international system of debts and loans as
we shall explain. But on the bad side for the borrowers,
when times are difficult, it is also the only way to access
international loans. Since the shares of votes inside the
IMF reflect the economic power of each member country,
the IMF is a tool used by a pool of strong economies to
impose their conditions on individual weak economies in
crisis. It is thus no surprise that the IMF is one of the
most controversial institutions. As already emphasized,
those who get to grant the loans in a monetary system
have the financial power on those to whom they grant
the loans, and the IMF is the incarnation of that power.
The structure of the international arrangement with
the IMF are however formally slightly complex. It is not a
structure which sits undoubtedly at the top of a monetary
tree, as the ECB sat at the top of the newly created
eurozone in 1999. It would be more exact to say that
the IMF mimics the apex of an international monetary
system as it funnels the loans and debts through it.
In a first stage, member countries joining the IMF have
to pay their quota share to the IMF, in dominant reserve
currencies (that is yens, euros, pounds and dollars) or
gold partly (25%), and the rest in their own currency11.
If we think of the Treasury and central bank of each
individual currency area as being consolidated, it does
not really matter if the Treasury emits bonds bought by
the central bank so as to be able to pay the part of the
quota share in national currency, or if it is the central
bank which just adds a new liability to its balance sheet
out of thin air. The latter possibility is the most sen-
sible implementation [and also the most common choice
made by governments (IMF, 2014)], because after quota
share payment, the central bank will receive an asset from
the IMF, denominated in Special Drawing Rights (SDR).
The SDR are equivalent to a weighted sum of the four
major currencies (yen, pound, dollar and euro). At first it
would seem that the IMF has the power of creating net
money in these dominant currencies, as a central bank
would do by accepting foreign currencies and transform-
ing them into national central bank money. Indeed a
country which has a weak currency would pay its quota
share in its internationally unused currency and get in re-
turn SDR which seem to be equivalent to assets in these
11 To be more precise, at its creation, these 25% had to be paid in
gold. As the quota shares were increased subsequently, they had
to be paid in one of the dominant currencies. The IMF pays no
interest on the gold part nor on the 75% contributed in national
currency. But it does pay interests on the non-gold part of the
25% of the quota share (IMF, 2014)
four dominant currencies.
But in order to make sure that this is not the case, the
IMF makes sure that the SDR are not claims on the as-
sets of the IMF. So the SDR are valued as a weighted sum
of the dominant currencies, but they are not IOUs in this
basket of currencies. So in the first stage, member coun-
tries contribute for 75% which costs them nothing and
which is created out of thin air, and in return they get
liabilities which are worth nothing. There is thus a need
for a mechanism to ensure that, even though the SDR are
not claims on the assets (the reserves) of the IMF, they
can be exchanged for the dominant currencies. If coun-
tries which need dominant currencies to finance a current
account deficit, or for reserve management purposes (in
order to try to defend a currency peg), cannot find coun-
tries willing to buy the SDR in exchange of dominant
currencies, the IMF can designate countries which would
have to accept the bilateral trade. The difficulty in cre-
ating a currency is to get it accepted, and it is by this
mechanism, that the IMF is eventually sure that the SDR
will be accepted. In practice the IMF never had to use
this power because the account held in SDR at the IMF
bears interest, and the interest is the exact reflection of
short term interests rates of the corresponding basket of
dominant currencies. So the system has been made such
that possessing a SDR or the corresponding currencies
generates the same profits.
To be more precise, it is only the difference between
the quota share of SDR and the actual amount of SDR
held which generates interests. It is not entirely exact
to state this since interests are in fact paid on that part
of the 25% which was not paid in gold but in dominant
currencies, and this is likely to be because the IMF can
exchange them with interest-bearing Treasury bonds of
the corresponding dominant countries. The idea is that
75% of the quota share was paid in national currency cre-
ated out of thin air by the corresponding central bank.
Then in the remaining 25% of the quota share (the so-
called Reserve Tranche), the part which was paid in gold
was not generating interests and it should remain so af-
ter being paid to the IMF. But the part of the reserve
tranche which was paid in dominant currencies was most
likely held in Treasury bonds of the corresponding dom-
inant countries, and was bearing interests. In order to
make sure that countries are willing to become and re-
main members of the IMF, the IMF pays interests on
this part of the quota share to maintain the profits of
central banks. Ignoring this technical detail, one could
summarize the system by saying that if a country exactly
keeps unchanged its amount of SDR which corresponds
to its quota share payment, it does not receive any inter-
est. But if after some bilateral trades it has more SDR, it
should receive interests, and if it has less then it should
pay interests, in both cases in SDR. So the IMF is in-
specting the accounts of member countries in SDR, and
deducts interests from countries having less SDR than
the quota share and pays interests to countries having
an excess of SDR. It acts in that sense as a perfect bank
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which takes no intermediate profit to feed a net worth,
since the interest paid on short positions is the same as
the interest paid on long positions.
The SDR are a simple way for countries to gain a right
to be in debt, and are in that sense drawing rights. In-
deed, even if the SDR they hold are not a claim on the
IMF reserves, they are guaranteed to be able to exchange
them for dominant currencies, and then will have to pay
interests on their IMF account as it will have less SDR
than its initial quota share. But as we have seen many
times now, the financial power lies in the right to grant
loans. Since this system essentially grants the right for
member countries to borrow dominant currencies, this
has been intentionally limited. The quota shares are ac-
tually rather small, and in case a country would need to
defend an exchange rate or would need to finance a tem-
porary current account deficit this would very rapidly be
insufficient. If the scale at which the member countries
could go in debt in SDR was much larger, one could say
that this system achieves a first step toward the unifi-
cation of the international system. Actually it was de-
signed right before the end of the Bretton-Woods system
in 1969, when all currencies were traded in fixed exchange
rate. After the end of the international fixed exchange
rate, there was no more need, or no more will, for fur-
ther international integration and this might explain why
the system remained downscaled for a very long time.
However, after the international crisis of 2008, the quota
shares have been increased by at least one order of mag-
nitude, as the need for further international integration
was felt again.
But the first goal of the IMF was to grant loans, that
is to be at the apex of the international system. Since
no country wants the IMF to be a bank with a sovereign
power, it acts more like a financial institution than like
a bank. That is, at first it does not create the deposits
corresponding to the loans out of thin air, as a normal
central bank would do at its discount window for its na-
tional commercial banks, but really loans the funds which
were received in the quota share payments. In case of
crisis in a weak economy, that is if an economy has a
strong need of foreign dominant currencies, e.g. to deal
with a temporary commercial deficit, or to (try to) de-
fend a fixed exchange rate, the IMF would loan the funds
received and impose its conditions, which are the usual
structural reforms of the Washington Consensus. This
is how the power of granting loans is exerted on weak
economies. Any loan of the IMF comes with conditions,
that the economy in crisis has no choice but to accept.
But since the quota shares have been made intention-
ally small, the lending capabilities of the IMF are limited
in case of huge global crisis. These are the two sides of the
same coin. Furthermore, an economy in crisis wants to
borrow strong currencies, and not all sorts of currencies
which have been given to the IMF in the quota share
payments. So the IMF sometimes needs to borrow di-
rectly from the central banks of the dominant currencies
the funds that it will then lend to the countries in crisis.
FIG. 23 Top: The IMF has allocated the SDR according to
the quota shares, in exchange of foreign reserves (it is over-
simplified here as each central bank has paid its share only
with its national currency). In dashed line there is a pend-
ing payment due to e.g. a commercial deficit from country 2.
Bottom: In order to settle the payment, the country 2 agrees
to sell some SDR (for simplicity we assume all currencies are
exactly at par at that moment) in exchange of foreign reserves
(in the example it is in exchange of euros). With these eu-
ros the country 2 is able to settle the payment. As a result
country 2 now owes the amount borrowed in SDR plus inter-
ests, and the country 1 now owns more SDR and will receive
interests on it.
This is made possible by the Arrangements to Borrow
which are formally equivalent to a temporary increase of
the quota share for the countries involved in the arrange-
ment. By doing so, the IMF acts only as an intermedi-
ary for credit condition negotiations between the various
dominant countries which are lending to the countries in
crisis. The IMF starts as a financial institution which
lends the deposits of its contributors, but if necessary it
is just acting for the dominant central banks.
In Fig. 24 we depict the situation in which a country
borrows the currency of a dominant country to then pay a
third party, possibly because of a current account deficit.
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We considered the case were the IMF has enough of this
dominant currency from the quota share payments. The
graph is more complicated than expected because the
IMF does not want to think itself as a financial institu-
tion which lends. So it rather builds the transaction as
a repurchase agreement. The country in crisis formally
purchases with its own currency (which it can create out
of thin air in unlimited amounts) the dominant currency
that it needs, and the IMF is committed to return it
once the loan is repaid. As stated in the IMF annual
report (IMF, 2014), “although the purchase-repurchase
mechanism is not technically or legally a loan, it is the
functional equivalent of a loan”. For simplicity, we have
considered that the country which lends the dominant
currency is also the country of this dominant currency,
but it can also happen that one dominant currency is
lent by another country if the latter has strong foreign re-
serves. This leads to a more complicated situation which
could also be explained visually by its graph structure.
By analyzing the structure of the loans made by the
IMF, we realize that the amounts lent come from the
usual creation of central bank money by the dominant
central banks against a debt with interest. The only dif-
ference being that the debt is to be repaid through the
IMF, meaning that the conditions are set by the IMF.
The IMF is only there to funnel the loan through a sin-
gle institution, to strengthen the creditors with respect
to the debtor. That way, it makes sure that the loans
made in the various dominant currencies are made under
the same conditions, so that the economy in crisis is left
with absolutely no alternative, no negotiating power to
put the dominant central banks in competitions for the
funds they loan. This way of hammering weak economies
is so efficient that the IMF always gets repaid. Indeed,
whenever a loan is made, there is a risk that it will not
be repaid. By acting together through the IMF, the
creditors make sure that there is no possibility for the
weak country to default. On the contrary, through the
so-called structural adjustments, the creditors make sure
they can be repaid by the sales of real assets, such as ma-
jor public companies, since they stand strong together to
impose it.
V. OPEN DISCUSSIONS
We are still very far from having given a comprehensive
description of the current monetary system. However we
have presented the key features, the salient points, which
are required to understand in deeper details any partic-
ular part of the system. Any refinement is just a zoom
in greater details into the general graph of asset/liability
relations. There are however a few points that are worth
being mentioned, even though we necessarily have to re-
main superficial.
FIG. 24 Top: at first the IMF lends to the country in need the
dominant currency that it has received from the quota share
payments. The country in need receives thus a liability from
the central bank of this dominant currency but it then owes
the same amount with an interest rate to the IMF. Since the
IMF does not want to formally lend, it prefers to think that
it sells the dominant currency to the country in need with
a repurchase agreement. The country in need creates out of
thin air more of its currency that it gives to the IMF, and the
IMF is committed to return it at a later time and without
interest when the initial loan is repaid. The black dotted line
highlights the repurchase agreement which has been agreed
upon. Bottom: the country can pay the third party and is
left with a debt toward the IMF.
A. Central banks accounting
We have described a bank as being a net worth re-
sulting essentially from the difference between assets and
liabilities. The customers can also in a sense be consid-
ered as banks since they also have assets and liabilities,
from which one can define a net worth. However adding
this detail in the graph is not really useful and adds un-
necessary complexity which would hamper the clarity of
graphical representations. For this reason, we have de-
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liberately treated the customer, that is the leaves of the
tree structure, differently from a commercial bank.
One might ask a similar question about the other part
of a given currency tree-structure. That is we might won-
der if the central bank itself could not be described as a
standard bank, with a given net worth. Of course again,
the answer is that it is possible, but again, as for cus-
tomers, this would add unnecessary complexity. Cen-
tral banks can be formally treated as usual commercial
banks, but they will still remain special as they are by
construction the issuers of the fundamental IOUs of a
monetary system, which are the central bank money li-
abilities they issue. Technically they can always add a
new liability which has no asset counterpart, if they feel
it is necessary, e.g. if they give central bank money to
the Treasury instead of lending. That would increase the
total net money, as it amounts to central money print-
ing. One can argue (see § III.A.1) that if we consider a
consolidated state, with Treasury and central bank taken
together, then even if the Treasury issues a bond for the
central bank money it receives and then spends, from
the outside, it will be equivalent as a shift in the total
net money, that is it is equivalent to net money creation.
Many have thought that if we allow for these possibilities,
pure direct money creation or indirect money creation by
direct financing of the Treasury, this would undermine
the confidence in the monetary system as it would pos-
sibly foster inflation in the long run. The neo-chartalists
would argue that the confidence would be restored as
long as the sovereign states tax enough money so as to
drain out the inflation driving excess of net money. Pure
money creation can always be reverted by taxes, but in
the process it leads to internal redistribution among citi-
zens, so eventually the debate is a political debate about
inequalities.
It is a fact that these fears have currently won the
debate, especially in times in which governments have
campaigned about tax reductions. This led to decide in
nearly all developed countries, that:
• the Treasury should never sell its bonds directly to
the central bank;
• the central bank should never create new liabilities
without corresponding assets.
As we already emphasized in § III.A.1, the Treasury now
needs to sell its bonds to the commercial banks, and the
central bank buys them after, in order to control the in-
terest rates, leaving a small profit to the benefit of com-
mercial bankers. As for the second point, the central
banks now need to define a net worth which should grow
only from the interests earned. All operations of cen-
tral bank creation must have a counterpart in the form
of a debt recognition, e.g. a Treasury bond, to main-
tain instantly the net worth to its value. To be short,
central banks should only act as commercial banks. The
interests earned are then spent back into the tree system,
either when the central bank pays its employees with it,
or when it transfers any remaining excess to the Trea-
sury12. If this was not the case, the net worth of the
central bank would increase and the total net money in
the rest of the system would decrease, with the risk that
it could possibly lead to deflation and then to recession.
But what happens to the foreign reserves and the com-
modities (gold) held by the central bank? Any change in
the exchange rate or any change in the price of gold,
which is a form of exchange rate, would affect the net
worth of the central bank. After a revaluation of for-
eign assets and gold prices, it would thus be fair that the
central bank transfers a corresponding amount of central
bank money to the Treasury, so as to maintain a constant
net worth. Indeed one could invoke that because the cen-
tral bank is the bank of the state, it should act in the
interest of everybody and thus share its benefits. Once
the Treasury spends, it would effectively increase the net
money held by the customers of the national monetary
system. And in the opposite case, when the prices of for-
eign currency and gold fall, the Treasury would need to
tax heavily so as to maintain the net worth of the central
bank.
The problem of course lies in the fact that we asked for
the net worth to be maintained constant, as we assumed
that the net worth of the central bank should belong to
everybody and should thus be shared. This is because
we have assumed that the central bank was a normal
bank whose natural shareholders, that is those who have
a right and a duty on the net worth, are the citizens
taken collectively. In order to circumvent this issue, it
is customary for central bank accounting to split the net
worth in two parts. The first part of the net worth is
increased by the interest received (and decreased by the
interests paid on reserves if it happens to be the case),
and the second part of the net worth varies only accord-
ing to the variations of foreign exchange rates and gold
prices. This second net worth is called Revaluation Ac-
count. It is then only the first part of the net worth
which is passed on to the Treasury. This situation is il-
lustrated in Fig. 25. To summarize, today the central
banks think themselves as commercial banks, and com-
municate in their reports about how well they managed
to increase their net worth, but in order to do so, they
need to ignore the major source of net worth variation.
Following that logic, the given amount at which the net
worth should remain is equal to the capital of the central
bank, since the central bank wants to consider itself as a
company with an initial capital input brought by stock-
holders. The capital of the ECB, that is the first part
12 The fact that all profits generated by the interests earned are
transfered to the Treasury is another way to realize that the
central bank is not independent and can meaningfully be consol-
idated with the Treasury. Indeed, the base interest rate that the
central bank charges on the loans made to commercial banks, as
it is passed on to the Treasury, can be viewed as a form of tax
levied on the borrowers of these commercial banks.
35
of the net worth, is held by the National Central Banks
(NCB) of the Europan Union (ECB, 2014).
FIG. 25 Top: When the commodity G or the foreign currency
F enter for the first time the balance sheet of the central bank
with a given price rG and exchange rate rF , a corresponding
amount central bank money is created M = rGG+ rFF , and
this is encapsulated in the revaluation account which starts
initially by being neutral. Bottom: when the price of the com-
modity and the exchange rate of the foreign currency have
evolved to different values r′G and r
′
F , this affects convention-
ally only the value of the revaluation account, which becomes
(r′G − rG)G + (r′F − rF )F , and not the value of the capital
which remains constant (C). Only the interests earned out of
the loans made to the commercial banks (which reduce the
net financial wealth of the private sector, M−C in this simple
description) might be transfered to increase the capital, but
they are instead given directly to the Treasury, who spends
them back when needed into the private sector.
B. State consolidation: artefact or reality?
The debate about state consolidation is probably the
most controversial debate, and also the most simple one
in terms of the underlying monetary graphs. First, one
should remind that we should always distinguish between
what has been, what happens to be now, and what should
or might be. The idea that central banks should be inde-
pendent has recently prevailed, reverting the history of
their creations. The idea that state intervention should
be restrained and that everything should be done to avoid
government interference in the private sector has gained
support over the past decades. Deciding that central
banks should be free is actually only a small step in that
direction, as one could instead decide much more radi-
cally to switch back to gold convertibility in a network of
competing commercial banks as in § II.B. But this would
lead us to the debate about what should or should not
be or could or could not be. Here we just want to discuss
what has been and what is currently happening in the
monetary systems.
If we examine the past situation, that is before most
central banks were proclaimed to be independent, then
for sure the Treasury and the central bank could be con-
solidated together as the Treasury could borrow directly
from the central bank. However, now that central banks
have been proclaimed to be independent, and have been
asked to defend the interest of savers (by defending a low
inflation rate, and thus the value of financial assets), this
can be questioned. Since the 2008 global financial crisis
(GFC), the central bankers were forced to react to the
rapidly rising deficits. In some countries, like in the UK
and in the US, the central bank has acted effectively in
the interest of the Treasury, as it bought huge amounts
of Treasury bonds of all maturities to keep the inter-
est rates under control. As argued in § III.A.1, apart
from the small profits given to bankers, this is equiva-
lent to a Treasury being financed directly by the central
bank. So the GFC has revealed that the central banks of
these countries communicate about independence to sat-
isfy their state allergic opinion, but still act as a creature
of state in the interest of the Treasury, that is in the gen-
eral interest. As long as the bankers get their profit mar-
gin in the intermediation they provide in financing the
public debt, there is certainly no lobby standing against
this system. In countries like the UK or the US, what we
can state for sure is that the current situation is a fake
independence of their central bank. For these countries
there is thus no logical impending of a state consolida-
tion and the monetary system is effectively the one of a
sovereign state currency. Those who reject state consol-
idation in the case of countries like the UK or the US,
given the behavior of their central banks, essentially con-
fuse what they would like to be, and what happens to
be.
C. The European Monetary Union
The ECB intentionally rejects the possibility of con-
trolling interest rates on Treasury bonds by buying au-
tomatically Treasury bonds on the secondary market.
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Even the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) pro-
gram, which was opposed by Germany but nonetheless
created after the Eurozone debt crisis sparked, was never
deployed since it was associated with too stringent con-
ditions. We comment briefly on this situation in this
section, even though it deserves more attention since it
is a crucial problem for the European Union, probably
the most important one as it undermines its foundations.
More details about the flaws of the European Monetary
Union can be found in e.g. Bell (2001).
When a central bank fails to buy its own Treasury
bonds to keep their interest rate under control, then the
consolidation of the Treasury with the central bank hides
some salient features of the system. This is exactly what
happens in the monetary union. By construction the
ECB cannot identify its Treasury bonds as there are sev-
eral distinct independent Treasuries. The ECB cannot
serve the interest of the European countries, and instead
serves indirectly only the interest of Germany. Indeed,
since only the interest rates of German Treasury bonds
remain low, this is as if the ECB was only managing
the interest rates on the German bonds, and not on the
other bonds. The spread of interest rates between the
various Treasury bonds and the German Treasury bonds
becomes then a measure of the disintegration of the Eu-
ropean Union. Effectively, peripheric countries are bor-
rowing in a foreign currency as their National Central
Banks (NCB) cannot control the interest rate of their
public debt. They thus face the same problems as weak
countries whose Treasuries need to borrow in foreign cur-
rencies and need to accept whichever conditions of the
creditors. In that specific case, one could say that the
ECB is effectively independent by being legally impo-
tent. This puts strong pressures on countries running a
public deficit, as the conditions are now set by commer-
cial bankers in their own interest, instead of being set
by central bankers in the interest of the whole monetary
system. The country with the smallest deficit, Germany,
is thus in position to impose its views on how other coun-
tries in the Eurozone should organize their economy, ef-
fectively leading to a Germany run EU. The last Greek
episode after the general elections of January 2015 is just
another episode of creditors setting stringent conditions
to debtors in an international competition. If the ECB
was acting as a normal central bank in a sovereign state,
it would buy as many Greek bonds as necessary to main-
tain a low interest rate, and Greek Treasury bonds would
be effectively part of the net total money as they will re-
main forever (see § III.E). One of the first things asked
by the Greek minister of finance was thus to exchange
the Greek bonds held by creditors with permanent debt
bearing a very low interest rate. He only wanted to re-
mind the creditors that public debts are meant to stay,
not to be reimbursed, as they are financial wealth to the
private sector.
This critical international tension inside the Eurozone
will only end when there is a sovereign state running
a sovereign currency. If the Eurozone monetary system
evolves drastically, it can enforce the enforce the normal
behaviour of the ECB, allowing for instance for the issu-
ing of European bonds whose interest rates are controlled
by the ECB. But this would mean that there is further
European integration as some financial solidarity would
need to be agreed upon. However, if the eurosceptic par-
ties win too many national elections, the previous situa-
tion where Europe is made of several countries, each with
its own sovereign currency, can be restored. This would
imply a strong devaluation of the new currencies of the
weak countries.
D. Monetary aggregates
Usually the amount of money in a given monetary sys-
tem is estimated through monetary aggregates. They all
correspond to using a subregion of the monetary system
for consolidation purposes. The total net asset consoli-
dated for that particular region is a particular aggregate.
1. M0 and MB
The simplest monetary aggregate is M0 and is com-
posed of the assets directly held by the customers at the
central bank, in the form of coins and paper money (C
in Fig. 26). Whenever a customer deposits money at its
commercial bank, this amount is reduced, and conversely
it is increased when deposits at commercial banks are
withdrawn in cash. If for simplification we assume that
some customers have everything in cash and other have
everything in commercial banks, the corresponding re-
gion is just made of those customers carrying only cash.
If we then include all net deposits held by commer-
cial banks at the central banks (including the reserves
they have at the central bank but subtracting their debt
toward the central bank), we just need to extend the
closed region to include the commercial banks with their
underlying tree-structure of assets and liabilities made
of deposits and loans. This defines the monetary basis
MB . We have made sure to exclude everything which
is related to the public debt issuing, and we have thus
made sure the contour of the closed region does not se-
lect this part of the commercial banks net worth. This
ensures that the entering lines of the contour are only
made of bank deposit at the central bank plus customer
account possessed in the form of coin and paper money.
We already see that since we have split the net worth of
bankers in two parts, excluding only Treasury bonds, but
including other assets, this definition of the monetary ba-
sis will always vary whenever the central bank does its
job of interest rate setting through the purchase and sells
of Treasury bonds. Indeed, when the central bank buys
bonds held by the bankers, and if it is able to do so at the
prevailing market price, it does not modify the net worth
of bankers, but the part of the net worth which has to be
included in the contour has to be modified. Put in other
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words, the aggregate MB counts only assets which enter
through central bank IOUs, but not the asset which have
entered from Treasury IOUs. Finally note that our defi-
nition for MB takes into account only the net deposits of
the commercial banks at the central bank, and not just
the deposits. This is different from the usual definitions
of the monetary basis. With our definition, any central
money borrowed at the discount window does not affect
the monetary basis MB , whereas it would affect the usual
definitions of the monetary basis.
2. Mnet and MCB
This arbitrariness leads to consolidate the full aggre-
gate of customers and bankers Mnet. This aggregate now
counts the Treasury debts as well, as it includes all types
of assets entering the bankers net worth. Whenever the
central bank engages in open market operations, buy-
ing or selling bonds, this monetary aggregate does not
change. It corresponds to the net financial assets held
by the whole economic system and this is what we have
called the net money. An operation of quantitative eas-
ing, which is just a massive outright purchase, changes
MB but not Mnet. But the whole system perceives only
its net position. This is why a quantitative easing has
no effect except a psychological one if widely advertised,
and a small effect on the profits made by bankers when
selling their Treasury bonds above market prices to the
central bank. This is where a clear understanding of
the aggregate under scrutiny, that is of the consolidation
which is considered, is crucial for the debate. If we use
the ambiguous word money for different aggregates, we
would unavoidably disagree on the effect of open market
operations. Those looking at MB would certainly agree
that it increases the money supply, whereas those looking
at Mnet would find no variation in their definition of the
money supply. Again the use of graphs in representing
what is considered considerably clarifies the debate.
However, it should be noted that Mnet is not conserved
whenever the Treasury spends by increasing its debt. We
can thus define a central bank aggregate MCB which en-
compasses everything but the central bank, and this one
will remain constant, whatever the public debt. This ag-
gregate is the reflection of all gold and foreign reserves
of the central bank (plus the foreign money possessed
directly by national citizens).
3. Mi
Further complication can also be introduced if we now
decide to exclude the liabilities of customers, but to in-
clude only some assets, in an attempt to extend MB .
This leads to the various definitions M1,M2, . . . , that we
gather collectively as Mi. The more assets of customers
are excluded (with all liabilities excluded in all cases),
the larger the aggregate Mi is. We thus have a hierarchy
M1 < M2 < . . . . Any loan issued by a bank would surely
affect some of the Mi as it would increase the assets held
by customers. Depending on the nature of the asset, it
would count in some Mi and not in others. These defini-
tions of the aggregates are a way to estimate the amount
of lending made by commercial banks. More precisely
the ratio between Mi and Mnet can be used the estimate
the amount of credit in the origin of money.
FIG. 26 Top: Schematic representation of M0 and MB . Bot-
tom: Mnet, Mi and MCB.
4. Aggregates in the economic debate
In the quantity theory of money, the variations of mon-
etary aggregates are assumed to be related to long term
inflation as they are assumed to affect the aggregate de-
mand. But the aggregate which should be used for such
a theory is ill-defined. Should we consider only the net
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money Mnet or a type of customers total assets as Mi?
The answer strongly depends on the behaviour of cus-
tomers and is certainly not unique. In time of optimism,
they might look only at their assets, and the amount
of outstanding credit is a driver of inflation. But they
could equivalently behave more pessimistically by also
looking at their liabilities, effectively taking decisions ac-
cording to Mnet. Again, forecasting the behaviour of
economic agents from aggregated indicators cannot work
since there is no universal law for the behaviour of people.
Some people at some given time in some given cultural
situation might react differently from other people of a
different epoch, at a different place with a different cul-
ture. Today, central banks have stopped monitoring the
various aggregates, since they finally understood that,
i) they do not control the Mi and ii) even if they did
they could not know how this can be used to control
the aggregate demand. They do not even control Mnet,
which depends also on public deficits. So they focus on
interest rates which they enforce through open market
operations. This discussion is continued briefly below in
§ V.F.
E. Sectoral financial balances
1. General construction
As we have just emphasized, defining aggregates on
some closed regions of a monetary system allows to dis-
cuss the situation of stocks at a given time. It also allows,
by looking at the variation of the stock, to examine the
flows for these regions. One would for instance rather
look at the variations of Mnet, than Mnet itself.
This idea of dividing the monetary system into major
consolidated areas so as to examine their flow relations
led to the so-called sectoral financial balances (SFB),
which were popularized as a tool of macroeconomic anal-
ysis by Wynne Godley (Godley, 1999, 2000; Godley &
Lavoie, 2007). The usual SFB analysis consists in divid-
ing the monetary system into three global regions, which
form a partition of the total system (that is such that
their union covers the whole system). The first sector is
the Treasury consolidated with its central bank, the sec-
ond sector is the total foreign sector, and the third sector
is the domestic sector. See Fig. 27 for an illustration.
The main interest in performing a partition is that it
enforces the global conservation of flows. Said differently,
the variations of the aggregate should compensate since
the total sum of the aggregate should remain constant.
In details, these aggregates evolve as follows.
• The government aggregate variation is noted T−G,
and its stands for the difference between what it
has taxed and what it has spent. The difference
being necessarily in form of increased public debt
if it is negative. From this aggregate perspective,
any tax T has reduced the liabilities of the cen-
tral bank toward the commercial banks, as it led
FIG. 27 Top: typical representation of the three main sectors.
Consolidated government, Foreign sector and domestic sector.
Bottom: we have added the real assets which do not sum up to
zero and are not conserved, since they are nobody’s liability.
Foreign assets cam be possessed by the domestic or the foreign
sector, just like domestic real assets.
to credit the Treasury account at the central bank.
Any spending G reverts this process. Spending by
public deficit affects the aggregate, in two possi-
ble ways. Either it increases the liabilities of the
central bank toward the commercial banks if the
central bank holds the new Treasury bonds, or it
affects the bank net worth if the Treasury bonds
are bought by the commercial banks.
• The total foreign sector variation comes from the
current account position of the domestic sector. If
the national system runs a current account surplus,
it drains IOUs from outside. From a graph per-
spective, this means that the number of IOUs from
outside toward either the national central bank, the
commercial bank, or simply directly the national
citizens if they hold foreign paper money, increases.
So the evolution of the foreign aggregate is −NX ,
where NX stands for the current account balance
of the national monetary system (net exports).
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• Finally the domestic sector aggregate is noted S−I,
where S stands for the variation of the total of as-
sets and I is the variation of the total of its lia-
bilities. S − I is simply the net variation of the
domestic aggregate in terms of financial assets.
By construction the sum of the aggregates variations
should vanish and we thus find the usual accounting iden-
tity
(T−G)+(S−I)−NX = 0 ⇒ S−I = NX+(G−T ) .
(5)
2. Current account balances
Note that a further simplified version of the sectoral
balances is used in national and international accounting.
Indeed, if instead of making a distinction between the
consolidated state sector and the domestic private sector,
we consolidate these together, then we have only two
aggregates. One is the total domestic sector (state and
private), and the other one is the total foreign sector
(all states and private foreign sector lumped together).
The variations of one of these two aggregates is then just
the current account balances in the national accounting.
Since they are necessarily opposite, we do not need to
specify which aggregate we consider, as it amounts only
to a sign convention. It is however standard to call the
variation of the financial wealth of the foreign sector as
the financial balance, and the variation of the financial
wealth of the total domestic sector as the current account
balance. The current account balance consists in looking
at the assets of the domestic sector which are in the form
of IOUs from the foreign sector, whereas the financial
balance consists in looking at the assets of the foreign
sector which are in the form of IOUs of the domestic
sector, also called foreign investments. An exportation
induces a positive current account balance, but a negative
financial balance as it reduces the foreign investments.
3. SFB analysis
The main conclusion from this analysis is that the do-
mestic sector can only save financial assets if the govern-
ment runs a deficit or if the current account is in surplus.
The main shortfall of such analysis is that it ignores
the variation of the real assets, as it focuses only on fi-
nancial assets. That is it considers only the variation
of assets which are claims on a debt. It is true that all
financial liability/asset relations should balance, as any
outgoing relation (a liability) has its ingoing counterpart
somewhere (the asset). But the picture would be more
complete if the evolution of real assets was also examined
at the same time. The amount of real assets can evolve
as companies are created or invest in production goods,
new houses are built, new discoveries are valued as as-
sets through patents etc... And the owners of the real
assets might evolve as the exchange of real assets can be
the counterpart of the exchange of financial assets, when
these real assets are purchased. If we model simply the
assets by two categories, one being the national real as-
sets, and the other one the foreign real assets, the SFB
analysis can be extended and this is depicted in Fig. 27.
The SFB analysis does not lead to too much contro-
versy per se, as it is an accounting identity. It is rather
how it is then used to predict the behavior of economic
agents and thus to predict the evolutions of an economy
that the SFB analysis leads to tough debates between
the various theories of economy (see for instance Fiebiger
(2013) for a critic of this type). Can we guess the deci-
sions on spending, that is roughly speaking the aggre-
gate demand, just by examining S − I? What about
real assets? And again, what about the fact that there
cannot be any universal law, as we already reminded in
§ V.D about monetary aggregates, given that what hap-
pens here, now, with these agents, might be different
there, later, with other agents. One should not however
be too pessimistic about economics and throw away all
econometric analysis based on aggregated indicators. We
should always remember that they are here to help de-
scribing a given situation, and not to forecast the future.
For instance, one cannot say that if S − I decreases
then the private sector will underspend. One can only
say that if S − I decreases, and if the private sector has
preferences, and maintains them, for a given amount of
net financial saving, then it will underspend since every-
body will try, and necessarily fail, to maintain its net
financial saving. The difference between the two propo-
sitions is that we assumed that some behavior of agents
(the amount of net financial saving desired) is conserved.
Taking decisions on aggregated indicators is thus a bet
on the evolution or the constancy of behaviors with re-
spect to these arbitrary indicators. Those who wanted to
reduce the public deficits while still in the midst of the
global financial crisis, have bet that the private sector is
happy to reduce its net financial wealth (for instance as-
suming they would prefer to increase the wealth located
in real assets). It is for instance the bet which has been
done in Europe. After years of stagnation and at the
brink of deflation, it is now obvious that it was as good
as betting on a lame horse.
F. Exogenous vs Endogenous money
The deep nature of money is a hot topic of the econom-
ical debate. First there is no unique answer as it depends
on the monetary system considered. We remind that we
should distinguish between what is possible and what is
actually realized.
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1. The current system: endogenous money
Today, every central bank has its own definition of
the various monetary aggregates. But apart for the net
money Mnet, the central banks have no control on ag-
gregates (e.g. the Mi), as they depend on the lending
effectively supplied by commercial banks, and this is why
they have stopped monitoring these indicators. In fact,
since reserves requirements can always be made at the
discount window, the commercial banks first lend and
then borrow what they need to comply with regulations.
This fact is usually phrased by saying that money is en-
dogenous. By money, we mean something related to the
total financial assets (without their associated liabilities)
of the private sector, somehow related to one of the Mi.
Note that when a commercial bank borrows money to
the central bank, it counts as reserves the central money
received, but does not subtract the corresponding debt.
So the required reserves themselves are endogenous and
can always be met. The banks only lend if they think
they will make a profit in their net worth, which essen-
tially means that they will lend if they think that they
will be repaid. It is thus strongly dependent on the true
economic situation. What is conserved, at least if there is
no current account deficit or surplus, is the central bank
money MCB as it is a pure reflection of gold reserves and
foreign reserves. In that case one could say that the ag-
gregate MCB is exogenous. If we ignore the foreign sector,
this statement is plain as it is just the statement that the
gold held by the central bank is conserved.
It is intriguing to see that the endogenous theory is
often ignored and most books prefer to present the ex-
ogenous system where the central bank supposedly con-
trols the commercial banks reserves and indirectly sets an
upper limit to credit money due to reserve requirements
(see Boermans & Moore (2009) for a discussion).
2. Other possible monetary systems
If instead the reserves required were net reserves, that
is if only the monetary basis MB was used in the defini-
tion of reserves, then the central bank would have more
control. Indeed the outstanding credits would necessarily
be capped by a multiplicative factor of this net central
bank money, due to reserve requirements. And the initial
logic of lending would be restored, in the sense that the
banks would need to have reserves first, and only lend
afterwards with a multiplicative factor set by the reg-
ulation. Indeed even if they borrow from the discount
window, that would not affect MB since they build at
the same time a liability and an asset toward the cen-
tral bank. But one must bear in mind that whenever
the central bank engages in open market operations, it
would buy Treasury bonds from the commercial banks
and increase accordingly MB , so the central bank would
have to reject this possibility (see Fig. 26 to visualize it).
More control on the total money comes with less control
on interests.
One can push this logic and try to imagine other sys-
tems to circumvent this. Maybe instead of using MB for
the definition of reserve, we should perhaps use Mnet.
Then the central bank would still be able to control the
interest rate as the open market operations do not af-
fect Mnet. But this is already much more complicated,
because the reserve requirement for each bank now de-
pends indirectly on the Treasury. A bank could meet
its reserve requirements one day, but if the Treasury in-
creases its debt, then it might not meet its requirement
anymore. So it would imply to control very strictly the
public deficit. The central bank would control both the
total credit money and the interest rate, but the Trea-
sury would have its hands tied as it would not be able to
spend more than what it taxes, and that would be the
end of politics.
3. Horizontalism and Verticalism
The graph representation also helps to visualize the
statement that a monetary system has both a vertical and
an horizontal component (Moore, 1988). Indeed, having
identified the root of the tree as the central bank, we
might say this is the ground floor of the system. On the
first floor we would then find the nodes which are below
the central bank, and that would include the commer-
cial banks and the Treasury13, although by consolidation
one might prefer to integrate the Treasury to the root
of the tree. Below the commercial banks we typically
find the customers and the net worth of banks. So the
vertical structure appears very visually in the tree struc-
ture. Each node is promising at the level below the IOUs
that it has received from the level above. The horizontal
structure in the system is revealed by the polarization in
assets and liabilities below a given node. It lies in the
amount of credit that a given node has granted below
it, and is thus endogenous. It is often referred to as the
circuitist description of money. The vertical structure
is imposed by the top of the tree, that is the consoli-
dated government since the liabilities of the tree root are
equal to the net assets of the leaves, as each node should
be neutral. The horizontal and vertical structure of the
monetary system is illustrated in Fig. 28. This struc-
ture is also often referred to as a pyramidal structure in
economic literature, rather than a tree structure.
Conclusion
We have first presented natural tools to describe and
discuss the theories of money. Indeed as formulated
13 In the EMU, there is an additional level due to the National
Central Banks.
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FIG. 28 Schematic representation of the underlying nature
of money. It originates from a consolidated sector which con-
trols by spending and taxing the vertical inflow. As for the
horizontal component, it is originated by credit creation, and
is endogenously determined by the economic conditions. Each
node (the commercial banks) has debt/liability relations to-
ward the level above and the level below.
by Minsky (1992, p12): “A capitalist economy can be
described by a set of interrelated balance sheets and in-
come statements”, and we argued that graphs for finan-
cial stocks are the easiest way to achieve this idea. By
drawing together the balance sheets in a graph rather
than explicitly writing one after another the balance
sheets of each institution [e.g. in the figures of McLeay et
al. (2014) or in the balance sheets explanations of Keen
(2014)], we found that a given financial arrangement can
be described more easily, and this simplifies the argu-
mentation about the monetary systems.
For pedagogical reasons we have overlooked some
building blocks which were not essential for understand-
ing the general method. Even if we alluded to it, we have
not insisted on the description of real assets as we inten-
tionally restricted our description to the financial part
made of asset/liability relations. We also ignored the
representation of private companies, but they can eas-
ily be incorporated as a set of financial assets, real assets
and liabilities, which induce a net worth possessed by the
owners. Even for banks which are a type of company, we
have not shown the relation between the net worth and
the owners of the net worth (the stockholders) so as to al-
leviate the graphs. Instead we have deliberately focused
on controversial topics about money. Indeed we devel-
oped in details how these tools can be used to analyze
the structure of the state, with its central bank and its
Treasury, and understand the true nature of money. We
argued that in sovereign states running sovereign curren-
cies, the Treasury and the central bank can be mean-
ingfully consolidated, as we showed how their actions are
coordinated thanks to the monetary policy. We explained
that the state only controls the net money through pub-
lic deficits, that is it sets the boundary conditions for
the financial structure of the private sector, but it does
not control the amount of credit which is endogenously
determined.
The financial relations between all actors of a mone-
tary system are complex and simple at the same time.
They are simple because double-entry bookkeeping is
understood at all levels of the system, given that it is
extremely simple, and it is responsible for the conser-
vation laws in the financial system. At every vertex of
the graph, that is for every institution, the local laws of
financial accounting necessarily hold, and they enforce
the neutrality of the vertices in the graph structure.
In a physical system with a high number of particles,
there are complex structures which emerge from the
simple local laws, and they are quite often very difficult
to understand. Quite similarly, complex financial struc-
tures emerge out of the simple local laws of accounting,
due to a high number of financial interactions. As a
result, if the graph description is well understood, the
different schools of economic thought should agree on
the graph representation of any monetary structure,
as they should agree on the local accounting at each
vertex. Indeed, each given financial situation can be
summarized by drawing the corresponding graph. But
it will then appear that the disagreements always lie in
the interpretation, that is on the words they want to
drape around a given graph. This would be related to
the various possible consolidations which can be made in
a monetary structure, when trying to grasp the complex
structures emerging out of these simple local laws.
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